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Article
Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death of
Domestic Political Constituencies
Sara Dillon*
I. MAKING SENSE OF THE FUJI-KODAK CASE
On March 31, 1998, a World Trade Organization (WTO)
Panel presented its Report in the Fuji-Kodak case.1 The Panel's
decision ostensibly represented a stunning blow for U.S. com-
mercial interests, especially in light of the fact that many of the
issues raised in the case were extensions of U.S. preoccupations
during the so-called "Structural Impediments Initiative" of the
early 1990s. 2 The United States had long complained to Japan
* Law Faculty, University College Dublin
1. Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS44IR (Apr. 3, 1997) <httpj/www.wto.org/
wto/dispute/distab.htm> [hereinafter Fuji-Kodak Panel Report].
2. The Structural Impediments Initiative (hereinafter SII), a long series
of intense bilateral negotiations aimed at convincing Japan to liberalize its in-
ternal economy, was initiated by the Bush Administration to increase U.S. mar-
ket share in key Japanese sectors. See Jonathan D. Richards, Japan Fair
Trade Commission Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business
Practices: An Illustration of Why Antitrust Law Is a Weak Solution to U.S.
Trade Problems With Japan, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 921, 930-31 (1993). Richards
writes:
Working under the U.S. trade negotiators' assumptions and recogniz-
ing that the United States also has its own problems contributing to
the trade imbalance with Japan, the Bush Administration, starting in
July of 1989, engaged the Japanese government in a series of talks
seeking agreements for fundamental reforms in each country to reduce
the tension on their trade relations. That series of talks was called the
Structural Impediments Initiative. From their inception, the SII talks
had as much to do with politics as with erasing the trade deficit with
Japan.... [T]he six areas that the Japanese delegation agreed to ad-
dress under the SII talks were: Japanese savings and investment
patterns, land policy, distribution systems, exclusionary business prac-
tices, keiretsu relationships, and pricing mechanisms.
Id. See also KENJI HIGUCm, FiKuSHON TO SHITE NO SHOHisHA RIEKI (1991)
(describing in detail the political background against which America attempted
to persuade Japan to remove its protection for the small and medium retail
sector during the SII).
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about its failure to enforce competition law principles; the U.S.
had also long demanded that Japan eliminate its law protecting
small and medium retailers-the Large Scale Retail Stores Law,
or Daitenho.3
The transformation from the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 4 to the WTO regime has been characterized
by an enormous proliferation in causes of action and by greatly
increased legalism in dispute resolution.5 Panel decisions under
the new WTO undoubtedly led the U.S. to believe that it might
succeed in Fuji-Kodak and thus further extend the reach of
WTO law into domestic economies. The WTO's panel decisions
thus far have been unabashedly expansionist; they have shown
little concern for domestic regulation, regardless of the sensitiv-
ity of the local politics surrounding the regulation in question.
This trend perhaps encouraged the U.S. to raise novel argu-
ments in the course of the Fuji-Kodak dispute. In the view of
many commentators, the best U.S. argument in Fuji-Kodak
challenged the WTO-legality of the Large Scale Retail Stores
Law under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).6 This line of argument, though ultimately dropped,
3. See DAITENHO, 1973/10/1, Law No. 109 (Japan), as amended. Legisla-
tion was passed on May 27, 1998, repealing the Large Scale Retail Stores Law,
effective April 2000. See United States Trade Representative (USTR), Access to
Japan's Photographic Film and Paper Market: Report on Japan's Implementa-
tion of its WTO Representations, "Assessment of Japan's Implementation of
Specific Representations It Made to the WTO," at 2 (on file with author).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
5. See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE 38-39, 397-98 (1995). See generally David Palmeter & Pe-
tros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
398 (1998) (explaining the legal transition from the GATT system to the WTO).
6. In fact, the initial case involved three separate actions by the U.S.
against Japan. See Charlene Barshevsky, Press Statement, in United States
Trade Representative (USTR) (June 13, 1996) (on file with author). The USTR
initially stated that the U.S. would "make three separate requests for consulta-
tions under WTO auspices on the broad range of market access barriers in the
consumer photographic materials sector in Japan." Id. These were described
as follows:
First, the U.S. is requesting consultations regarding violations of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) and nullifi-
cation and impairment of GATT benefits arising from the full panoply
of liberalization countermeasures that the Government of Japan has
put in place and maintained to thwart imports in this sector.
Second, the U.S. is requesting consultations regarding violations
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) arising from
the requirements and operation of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law,
which constitute a serious barrier to foreign service suppliers as well
as imports of film and other consumer products.
[Vol. 8:197
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produced its desired result. Under an agreement reached dur-
ing preliminary Fuji-Kodak negotiations and outside the sup-
posedly transparent legalities of the WTO, the U.S. obtained a
Japanese commitment to abolish its Large Scale Retail Stores
Law.7
One interpretation of such pre-panel concessions is that
they have always been part of the negotiating process under the
GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. Yet "negotiations"
under the new WTO significantly differ from those under GATT:
since a country adversely affected by a Panel decision can no
longer prevent the decision's adoption,8 a "defendant" member
country now faces much higher stakes in the disputes process,
and therefore a complainant party's ability to threaten WTO ac-
tion to force long-sought regulatory concessions has increased.
Third, the U.S. is requesting consultations under a GATT decision
concerning consultations on restrictive business practices. Through
this mechanism, the U.S. intends to discuss with the Government of
Japan the significant evidence of anti-competitive activities that it has
uncovered in this sector, and to ask the Government of Japan to take
appropriate action.
Id.
In fact, the U.S. only proceeded to a panel on the issues relating to GATT.
There was a feeling in Japan that it was possible the U.S. would prevail on the
GATS argument. This would have had serious consequences for the Japanese
retail sector because reform of this sector would have been extremely politicized
and exposed to international scrutiny. This Article will demonstrate how the
U.S. came to make a "deal" with Japan, which in turn led the U.S. to drop this
aspect of the case. The third arm of the case, taken under the GATT decision on
restrictive business practices, is currently "in abeyance." The U.S. had origi-
nally asked for separate panels to deal with arguments under the respective
agreements.
7. See United States Trade Representative, "Assessment of Japan's Im-
plementation of Specific Representations It Made to the WTO," supra note 3, at
2.
On May 27, the Japanese government passed legislation repealing the
Large Scale Retail Stores Law ... effective April 2000. The U.S. Gov-
ernment welcomed the repeal of this law, which has been a major im-
pediment to the establishment, operation, and expansion of large retail
stores. Senior Japanese Government officials have acknowledged that
this action was taken because of concern that a WTO panel would very
likely find the Large Stores Law in violation of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS).
Id.
8. See Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Re-
port: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Compliance, 16 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307, 313 (1996) (noting that under the WTO system coun-
tries traded the power to block a decision for the mere right to appeal an ad-
verse decision).
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Such coercion occurs even when the defendant country has long-
standing policy reasons to retain the challenged domestic law.9
If viewed conventionally, the Fuji-Kodak case that re-
mained and went to the panel (based on GATT Article XXIII:
1(b), and GATT Articles III and XI) can be understood as an un-
common failure on the part of the U.S. to anticipate the Panel's
likely reaction to its legal arguments. The U.S. legal position
might be seen as uncharacteristically forced and convoluted, or
as simply an ineffective argument. The U.S. decision not to ap-
peal might serve as confirmation that the U.S. was aware of hav-
ing miscalculated. The case thus appears to some commentators
as simply an interesting oddity, notable only for the few argu-
ments concerning competition law and market access that were
ahead of their time.10
The case is unusual to the extent that the U.S. as complain-
ant does not normally fail at the WTO. Since WTO panels have
exhibited a willingness to interpret the already quite expansive
Uruguay Round Agreements broadly, many trade experts ex-
pected the U.S. to prevail. In my view, however, the U.S. did not
entirely lose Fuji-Kodak, because the US secured from Japan a
long-sought concession-a "sell out" of small business interests
in Japan by the Japanese bureaucracy which completely revised
national laws protecting the small and medium retail sector.
A. THE WTO AND EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC REGULATION
Academic fatalism attends research on international trade
law." Unlike scholars in other legal fields, international trade
scholars have avoided an empirical analysis of the effects created
by the law which dominates their field of inquiry: GATT/WTO.
Particularly in the post-1995 trading system, these experts as-
sume that a legal hierarchy exists in which international trade
rules trump domestic regulation.' 2
9. See John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United
States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 171 (1997) (noting that the WTO may cause ex-
ternal influences on domestic policy).
10. See, e.g., Douglas E. Rosenthal, Jurisdiction and Enforcement: Equip-
ping the Multilateral Trading System With a Style and Principles to Increase
Market Access, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 543, 543 & 554 (1998) (discussing compe-
tition law and market access under the WTO).
11. See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Trade and the Environment: A Challenge to the
GATTI WTO Principle of "Ever Freer Trade", 11 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT.
351 (1996) (noting the lack of public discussion).
12. See David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Pol-
icy: John Jackson and the Field of International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J.
[Vol. 8:197
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Yet domestic regulation often protects vulnerable national sec-
tors and reflects the culmination of political activity on behalf of
these groups. In the jargon of international trade, these "special
interests" are seeking "protectionist" measures by their govern-
ments. 13 Such political activity, however, is a key component of
democratic lawmaking and should not be so easily dismissed. 14
The Large Scale Retail Stores Law aspect of the Fuji-Kodak
case highlights the fundamental conflict between national demo-
cratic "inputs" and the external threat the WTO poses to them.
In 1997, when the Japanese Ministry for International Trade
and Industry (MITI) proposed a complete overhaul of the law
protecting small retailers, reportedly not one of Japan's parlia-
mentary representatives was in favor of changing the law.' 5
This is not to imply that there was no Japanese constituency in
favor of change. A number of sectors in Japan had long hoped
that external pressure would lead to revision of the Large Scale
Retail Stores Law.16 No reformist group within Japan, however,
INT'L L. & POL'Y 671, 703 (1995). Kennedy discusses the rhetorical universe
created by the eminent Professor John Jackson in his development of interna-
tional trade law as an academic discipline: "Jackson presents national policy
either as already part of international economic law . .. or as an unfortunate
deviation. In Jackson's view, the choice is not between those areas of national
public life which are part of 'domestic jurisdiction' and those which have come
to be regulated internationally, but between areas that do and do not support
liberal trade." Id. at 703.
13. There has been a good deal of comment on the problem of the demo-
cratic deficit in international trade law generally; however, most writing on the
subject is not presented with a sense of crisis. See, e.g., Andrea Schneider, De-
mocracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade Or-
ganizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 587 (1998) (describing the doctrine that
holds that democratic input by political constituents is really no more than
"political capture by narrow interests" within the state). Schneider sees the
solution in terms of individual ability to engage in and enforce the terms of the
international organization. Id. See also Wolf Sauter, The Economic Constitu-
tion of the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 27 (1998) (discussing a concep-
tually similar problem at the European level).
14. Id.
15. Interview with MITI official, in Tokyo, Japan (July 2, 1998).
16. See Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style
in Comparative and International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396
(1996). Upham writes:
[DI]espite retailers' general satisfaction with the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law (LSRSL), some level of reform became inevitable in the late
1980s. Foreign pressure was a major impetus for reform, but domestic
pressure was equally strong. Between 1988 and 1989, the Japanese
media, the Keidanren, the Economic Planning Agency ("EPA"), the
Fair Trade Commission ("FTC"), and the ... Second Administrative
Reform Commission all called for varying degrees of relaxation....
[Als the direct target of small retailers' pressure to strengthen the
LSRSL, only MITI resisted.
1999]
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had been able to defeat the political power of the small and me-
dium retail sector and achieve fundamental revision or repeal of
the law. Significantly, the decision in 1997 by Japan's elite bu-
reaucracy to repeal the law and set aside a central component in
Japan's commercial culture did not derive from a domestic
source.' 7 Rather, the final decision resulted primarily from the
immensely imaginative grafting together by the U.S. of a Sec-
tion 301 complaint submitted by the Kodak company to the
United States Trade Representative (USTR).
The Fuji-Kodak case stands at the crossroads of an increas-
ingly ambitious WTO and a long-held U.S. belief that market
access to Japan is blocked by a mysterious cultural essence, an
essence which can only be broken by a combination of relentless
pressure on Japanese decision-makers and threats of exclusion
from the U.S. market.' 8 The U.S. invoked such culturalist argu-
Id. at 420.
Regarding the larger Japanese retailers, Upham writes that "the funda-
mental consensus [among large retailers] is that the LSRSL should be applied
in a way more advantageous to the superstores. Without mincing words, they
would like a shift from restricted competition under the leadership of small re-
tailers to managed competition under the leadership of superstores." Id. at 419.
Finally, Upham also shows that the Large Scale Retail Stores Law was
meant to allow for the stable co-existence of small and medium retailers, with a
certain predictable share of the total retail market for larger department stores,
within competitive conditions controlled to some degree by MITI on the basis of
these policy considerations. Id.
17. There is a distinct "modernizing" faction within MITI, although that
faction would not have been able to convince politicians to accept drastic
changes to the Large Scale Retail Stores Law without the justification provided
by the prospective WTO case.
18. The "increasingly ambitious" WTO is a combination of proliferating
causes of action via the Uruguay Round Agreements covering intellectual prop-
erty, safeguards, and trade in services and investments, among others, and the
newly stringent consequences of losing in the dispute settlement procedure.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex II, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESuLTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND
vol. 1, (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). See also David Broiles, When Myths Col-
lide: An Analysis of Conflicting US-Japan Views on Economics, Law, and Val-
ues, 1 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 109 (1994) (discussing the longstanding U.S.
belief that Japan's market is kept closed though some mysterious cultural be-
havior-virtual cultural collusion). Broiles states that "Japanese successes and
American failures in trade are often explained in highly emotive or moralistic
terms. Japanese are said to be unfair, conspiratorial, unethical, guilty of impos-
ing stringent quotas, manipulative of the market, engaging in collusive market
practices, subsidizing industries, limiting access, biased against imports, and as
unfairly limiting product promotion." Id. at 112 (citing EDWARD LINCOLN, AN
AMERICAN POLICY AGENDA, JAPAN'S UNEQUAL TRADE 135-36 (1990)). Broiles'
conclusion is that "Japan challenges America's myth about itself." Id.
202 [Vol. 8:197
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ments to reinforce its position in Fuji-Kodak.19 Japan's re-
sponse was unusually pointed: the U.S. had substituted
prejudice for hard evidence. 20
This Article will explore Fuji-Kodak not as an anomaly in re-
cent WTO history, but as a case highly symbolic of the manner
in which social and cultural concerns at the national level are
being extinguished by the greatly enhanced legalism of the
WTO. 2 1 By examining recent WTO cases and the effects of WTO
actions within individual jurisdictions, this Article contends
that the new post-1995 WTO has altered the relationship be-
tween national governments as WTO representatives and their
political constituencies "back home."22 This Article concludes
19. See USTR, supra note 3. The USTR claimed that
[o]ur comprehensive investigation of the Japanese film market has
shown that the Government of Japan built, supported, and tolerated a
market structure that thwarts foreign competition, and in which exclu-
sionary business practices are commonplace.... We see in this sector
the same market barriers that are present in sector after sector in Ja-
pan. These are systemic structural barriers, such as closed distribu-
tion systems and excessive regulation, that we have been discussing
with Japan for years. With the detailed evidence uncovered in this in-
vestigation, we now have a clear understanding of how these barriers
have interacted to keep out competitive foreign products in a particular
sector.
Id. at 1.
20. See Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Pa-
per, First and Rebuttal Submissions of the Government of Japan (3 April 1997
and 20 May 1997), available in 1997 WL 295222. In these documents, Japan
was adamant that the U.S. had substituted mischaracterization for fact. In
MITI's executive summary of its First Submission, it stated that "[t]he United
States accuses Japan of having masterminded and maintained for over 30 years
a conspiracy with its domestic industry to block imported film and paper from
the Japanese market." Id. at 2. MITI accused the U.S. of "gross inaccuracies"
in describing Japanese behavior. Id. at 3. MITI also claimed that the U.S. ap-
proach was "factually inaccurate" and "legally baseless." Id. at 8, 10.
21. It does appear that the U.S. took the opportunity of Kodak's complaint
concerning market access for film in Japan to push MITI into acting on its past
commitments to abolish the Large Scale Retail Stores Law. It is probable that
the U.S. dropped the most potent part of the overall case (the GATS arm) be-
cause it had already obtained what it most wanted-the imminent possibility of
penetration of the Japanese retail market by mega-retailers from the U.S.
22. In a certain sense, the new legalism of the WTO offers a grand simplic-
ity to the national negotiators. Unlike the convoluted world of pre-1995 trade
diplomacy, the adversarial WTO system creates clear winners and losers. It
offers an opportunity for national governments, which had been struggling with
the resistance of traditional domestic constituencies to changes being brought
about by trade principles, to justify a new departure in which "adjustment" re-
places protection. A stunning example of this process is in the agricultural con-
text. The WTO has provided a basis for the European Community to reduce
economic support for the farming sector in a manner that would not otherwise
have been politically feasible.
1999]
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that the threatened Fuji-Kodak litigation made Japanese deci-
sion-makers aware that the new GATS Agreement had the po-
tential to invalidate Japan's retail sector regulations, with
unpredictable results. Rather than face such a legal bruising,
MITI decided to alter the Japanese retail law, but in such a way
as to confuse and pacify the endangered domestic
constituency. 23
II. THE DEMOCRATIC FLAW IN THE WTO
There has been substantial academic discussion of the alleged
usurpation of national sovereignty by the WTO and regional
trade blocs, as if the most important change brought about in
1995 was that nations would no longer exercise full powers of
external and internal decision making.24 Yet sovereignty en-
Furthermore, no member country of the WTO is, as a national entity,
either entirely advantaged or disadvantaged. The WTO system (in a more fully
developed version of the old GATT) is in fact an interlocking web of national
objectives. The troublesome point is not that the participant nation sometimes
loses, but that now with striking regularity, certain national sectors-after hav-
ing struggled to gain political protection-are being left unprotected by the
working of WTO law. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade,
Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459 (1994) (highlight-
ing the debate regarding trade and the environment); see also Robert F. Hous-
man, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 699 (1994) (advocating that internal trade rules should incorporate demo-
cratic principles).
A number of other recent, high-profile WTO cases have involved the invali-
dation of environmental and other forms of "protective" domestic regulation
through the application of WTO rules. In those cases, the conflict between
stark trade rules and the domestic impulse to regulate is clear and dramatic. In
Fuji-Kodak, largely because the U.S. lost the case and because the most signifi-
cant part of the overall case was dropped through a form of settlement agree-
ment between Japan and the U.S., commentators have largely failed to grasp
the significance of what has taken place vis a vis the world of Japan's small
retailing sector. Some specialists in Japanese retailing believe that MITI's de-
cision to push the political establishment towards the abolition of legislative
protection for this sector will herald rapid and irreversible changes in Japanese
domestic commercial relations. See KATsuHIKo NAMIKATA, DAITENHo HAISHI:
EiKyo To T~io 112-56 (1998).
23. It must be noted that it was MITI's apparent wish to avoid the possibil-
ity of having Japan's retail sector discredited at the international level through
an adverse panel ruling that led to the decision to move forward with abolishing
the Large Scale Retail Stores Law. Yet MITI's new strategy-the creation of a
set of alternative laws to replace the Large Scale Retail Stores Law-can in no
way foster meaningful continued protection of the small and medium retail
sector.
24. See, e.g., William Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United
States' Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 Am.
U. J. INT'L L. REV. 1225 (1998) (describing steps taken by the U.S. to protect its
state sovereignty within the new WTO). See also George Bermann, Constitu-
[Vol. 8:197
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compasses more than the rights of a nation to act independently
among other nations. It also includes a nation's ongoing capac-
ity to respond adequately to democratic "inputs," which serve as
the proper building blocks of national legislation. 25
Democratic theory requires constituency input, legislative
response, and judicial interpretation. The power of the new
WTO to invalidate even the most hard-won domestic legislation
should be generating heated debate, as opposed to an esoteric
and sanitized one over the meaning of state sovereignty. The
emphasis in academic circles on the rights and powers of the na-
tion state, as opposed to the rights of persons living within those
states, is highly misleading in that it suggests that the only is-
sue is whether a state can legitimately waive its sovereignty. 26
Many experts justify the WTO system by noting that individual
states have ratified the WTO Agreement. 27 Even so, the state
cannot legitimately waive the democratic rights of its citizens to
influence the content of national legislation. 28
Though characterized as more diplomatic than "legal," the
GATT system from its inception in 1947 was nonetheless power-
ful to the extent that it could generate important international
publicity for or against a country. Thus, even in its pre-1995
form, GATT exerted strong, even coercive, economic influence. 29
tional Implications of U.S. Participation in Regional Integration, 46 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 463 (1998) (exploring the hierarchy of laws as between international
trade treaties and inconsistent national law).
25. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 157 (examining the nature of
sovereignty).
26. Id.
27. See generally Housman, supra note 22 (noting the lack of democratic
input in the development of international law).
28. The Uruguay Round Agreements in particular are extremely varied in
subject matter and contain virtually endless bases upon which national regula-
tion can be invalidated. It is impossible to imagine that citizens in the many
countries in which these agreements were ratified had anything more than the
most cursory understanding of either the content of the agreements or their
implications for national legal regimes. There was no attempt to present the
agreements as individual subjects of examination and political choice.
It should be recognized that the agreements that make up the WTO system
are far more powerful than virtually any other treaties. No single-subject mat-
ter convention could induce compliance with the effectiveness of the multi-
sectoral WTO regime. The possibility of economic retaliation outside the sector
of the original dispute ensures that the consequences of non-compliance are, for
any WTO member, extremely high.
29. Even in those cases where panel reports were blocked by adversely af-
fected contracting parties, the domestic law found to be GATT-illegal tended to
be revised, if not abolished, over time. Note, for example, changes to U.S. law
after losses at the GATT in the Domestic International Sales Corporations case
and The Tuna -Dolphin case. See United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Report
1999]
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Before 1995, however, the GATT system was not designed to im-
pose an absolute will on participating states through orders and
sanctions. States could block panel decisions unfavorable to
themselves, thereby rendering the legal import of such decisions
ambiguous, because panel reports only gained legal effect upon
adoption by consensus of all participating GATT parties.30
In addition to the decisive shift in 1995 away from a "diplo-
matic" approach to international trade rules and dispute resolu-
tion, the Uruguay Round created a number of significant
agreements, encompassing areas not traditionally part of the in-
ternational trade regime. These agreements increased the
causes of action available to GATT/WTO plaintiffs.
This heady combination of greatly enhanced powers of gen-
uine enforcement for WTO panel decisions, along with new and
unexplored causes of action, meant that domestic constituencies
were now far more vulnerable to the diktats of the WTO legal
system. Previously, such constituencies were shielded from
harsh trade rules by national governments that were to some
degree responsive to democratic inputs. Indeed, as the WTO has
increased its scope, so too has the scope of anti-democratic inter-
ference by the WTO in delicate domestic law regimes.
A. THE ASSUMPTION THAT WTO LAw TRUMPS: A FICTIONAL
HIERARCHY OF LAws
It is unclear how the WTO came to supersede domestic reg-
ulation in the hierarchy of laws. There has never been a global
referendum on the subject.3 1 Many of the major disputes decided
since 1995 can be seen as case studies on the following theme:
WTO law is treated as fundamental and absolute, whereas na-
tional laws in such areas as public health, the environment, and
economic protection for farmers or small business are treated as
of the Panel, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23' d Supp.) at 98 (1977); United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39'
Supp.) at 155 (1993).
30. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XXII.
31. While there has much critical comment in Europe concerning the dem-
ocratic deficit in the EU, at least new areas of subject matter brought into the
foundational Treaty requires referenda to be held in each of the participating
members. See P. Raworth, A Timid Step Forwards: Maastricht and the
Democratisation of the European Community, 19 EuR. L. REV. 16 (1994). See
also William Wallace & Julie Smith, Democracy or Technocracy? European Inte-
gration and the Problem of Popular Consent, 18 W. EuR. POL. 137 (1995) (dis-
cussing the absence of democratic input in the EU).
[Vol. 8:197206
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contingent and optional, at least to the extent that these regula-
tions can be undone by a WTO decision. 32
It is an open question why individual member countries do
not resist adverse decisions more vocally. No WTO member
country, however, is a political monolith. In some instances, na-
tional decision-makers may be happy to have the excuse of WTO
fiat to undo the effects of long years of lobbying by interested
citizens to pass protective legislation.33 Prior to the Uruguay
Round, national governments could not honestly inform domes-
tic constituencies that they were being "forced" by the GATT to
abandon protection of those constituencies' interests. In the
post-Uruguay Round world, they can invoke international legal
necessity, thus removing a great deal of direct internal political
pressure. 34
The dull, technocratic language of WTO law serves to con-
ceal its essential radicalism. A number of the principal cases
recently decided at the WTO, however, demonstrate that the
WTO is now capable of brusquely undoing the legislative will of
national constituencies as expressed in domestic legislation.
These constituencies lack a sufficient understanding of the WTO
to know how to protest. Yet even if they did attempt organized
protest, there is no responsive political mechanism at the WTO
level. All such a constituency can do is exert pressure on the
national government to alter its participation in the WTO. In
response, the national authorities would undoubtedly counter
32. See, e.g., Jennifer Schultz, The Demise of "Green" Protectionism: The
WTO Decision on the US Gasoline Rule, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1996)
(discussing the WTO finding that the Environmental Protection Agency's regu-
lation on imported gasoline was inconsistent with WTO obligations);
Charnovitz, supra note 22 (discussing the impact of GATT rules on the
environment).
33. This is especially true in difficult and financially draining areas such as
agriculture. It is indisputable that the European Union has been able to shift
responsibility for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy onto the WTO.
Why and how the EU decided to include agricultural products within those
products covered by free trade "discipline" is an issue that has not yet been fully
explored. Farmers within the Member States of the EU itself also imperfectly
understand this matter. See Al J. Daniel, Jr, Agricultural Reform: The Euro-
pean Community, the Uruguay Round, and International Dispute Resolution,
46 ARK. L. REv. 873 (1994) (describing some of the difficulties associated with
bringing agricultural products into the GATT system). See also Miguel Antonio
Figueroa, The GATT and Agriculture: Past, Present, and Future, 5 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 93 (1995) (discussing the complexities of international agricultural
law); Jeffrey Steinle, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for Ag-
riculture, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333 (1995) (discussing the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture).
34. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XX(b).
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that the new WTO is an "all or nothing" proposition and that
member nations must accept all of the agreements in their en-
tirety, with little meaningful opportunity for national
derogation. 35
In addition, WTO panel and appellate body reports are oddly
restricted to the discourse of free trade principles. In this sense,
the WTO is without equity; it is a set of legal rules without
human context. 36 Disputes are settled according to one legal
yardstick-namely, whether or not free trade principles have
been breached through the operation of the national law being
challenged. The discourse of the panel reports thus actually
suppresses significant contextual issues surrounding the partic-
ular dispute.37 Defendant nations are in effect precluded from
arguing complex legislative motivations before the panels in an
35. Astonishingly, most academic commentators on the WTO praise the
fact that, unlike its predecessor, the new WTO is an "all or nothing" proposition.
Several extremely significant characteristics of the negotiation results
should be noted. Perhaps foremost is the 'single package' idea, which
the negotiators had embraced some years earlier and had resolved to
make an important aspect of the negotiation. The idea was that there
should be one complete elaborate text to which all those who wanted to
become members of the new structure must adhere and accept. This
would be in contrast to the Tokyo Round result which included specific
individual agreements that were optional ("GATT a la carte").
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 47 (2d ed. 1998).
Given what was at stake for domestic political constituencies around the
world, and in light of basic democratic theory, this is an extraordinary admis-
sion that the ultimate purpose of the WTO was, in effect, to remain isolated
from even the indirect pressure that might have been exerted on the contents of
the Uruguay Round by a system of weighted voting for adoption.
36. See Schneider, supra note 13 (discussing the school of thought that
characterizes domestic political input as "special interest" influence and sees
liberal/free trade rules as lofty and correct in direct proportion to their freedom
from such influences). To articulate such a theory, however, is to beg the ques-
tion, especially in the absence of an international referendum on its underlying
premise.
37. See generally JoHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAP-
ITALISM (1998)
Those who seek to design a free market on a worldwide scale have al-
ways insisted that the legal framework which defines and entrenches it
must be placed beyond the reach of any democratic legislature. Sover-
eign states may sign up to membership of the World Trade Organisa-
tion; but it is that organisation, not the legislature of any sovereign
state, which determines what is to count as free trade, and what a re-
straint of it. The rules of the game of the market must be elevated
beyond any possibility of revision through democratic choice.
The role of a transnational organisation such as the WTO is to project
free markets into the economic life of every society. It does so by trying
to compel adherence to the rules which release free markets from the
encumbered or embedded markets that exist in every society. Transna-
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attempt to salvage their national regulations. Because of the "all
or nothing" structure of the Uruguay Round acceptance proce-
dure, member countries are presumed to have "agreed" to the
entire content of the new agreements, and thus they have no
legitimate defense based on extra-WTO considerations. "Inter-
disciplinary" balancing of rights and interests, a commonplace
judicial preoccupation in most jurisdictions, is virtually un-
known at the WTO.
The startling power of WTO law over national regulation is
most clearly in three important cases: The EC Beef Hormones
case, 38 the Indian Pharmaceuticals case, 39 and the EC Banana
Regime case. 40 In each dispute, important domestic values were
reflected in the targeted legislation. The defending parties were
essentially forced to remain silent about the underlying pur-
poses behind the legislation, because justification for a domestic
law's existence would be irrelevant before the panel. GATT/
WTO principles thus effectively trump other regulatory values,
rendering countless important national laws legally precarious.
Moreover, WTO member countries may be less willing to pass
such protective legislation, fearing that the legislation could
later face a WTO challenge.
tional organizations can get away with this only insofar as they are
immune from the pressures of democratic political life.
Id. at 18.
In Gray's terminology, "encumbered" or "embedded" markets are those
tending towards social stability, as opposed to the profound instability of the
"free" market. Id.
38. EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Com-
plaint by the United States & Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA
(Aug. 18, 1997) <http://wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm> [hereinafter Hormones
Panel Report]; EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan.
16, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm> [hereinafter Hormones
Appellate Report].
39. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemi-
cal Products, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997) <http'/
www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm> [hereinafter Patent Panel Report]; In-
dia-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Prod-
ucts, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm> [hereinafter Patent Appellate
Report].
40. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distri-
bution of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador & Report of the Panel, WTO Doc.
WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>
[hereinafter Bananas Panel Report]; European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body,
WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/dis-
tab.htm> [hereinafter Bananas Appellate Report].
1999] 209
0MN. J GLOBAL T4DE
1. The Beef Hormones case
In Beef Hormones, both the Panel and Appellate Body deci-
sions held that the European Community ban on hormone-
treated beef was unlawful under the Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment).41 The principal question in the case involved the degree
of freedom a WTO member retains to institute a ban on food
treated with a substance believed by the member to pose a
health risk, when the relevant international organizations hold
a different, less critical view or when there is no relevant inter-
national standard. The Panel found against the EC, declaring
that an assessment of risk under the SPS Agreement must be "a
scientific examination of data and factual studies; it is not a pol-
icy exercise involving social value judgments made by political
bodies."42 The Panel then examined the scientific evidence, and
concluded that the EC failed to present risk assessment tech-
niques and scientific results that would permit the Panel to find
the trade ban to be WTO-legal. 43
The EC raised many important issues on appeal, including
the proper standard of review for WTO panels in such cases. 44
The EC challenged the Panel's lack of deference towards the
EC's own conviction (even if derived from general studies of hor-
41. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-4 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
Briefly put, the SPS Agreement is aimed at national laws regulating food
additives and contaminants as well as public health dangers posed by and to
plants and animals. The obvious concern underlying the drafting of the SPS
Agreement is that WTO members might use such measures as "protectionist"
devices. There is, it must be noted, no corresponding requirement of minimum
health or safety standards within the WTO. In essence, WTO members should
base SPS measures on the findings of an enumerated list of international bod-
ies; where the national standard is higher than these "recognized" standards,
the members must show their standard to be based on scientific evidence, or on
a demonstrable assessment of risk. Such a set of requirements has the effect of
devaluing national sensitivities which may not be based on fact or risk assess-
ment, but rather on deeply held beliefs not immediately susceptible to proof-
such as a belief in the "limits to science," as argued by the EC in the Beef Hor-
mones case. In addition, the requirements raise the overall cost of maintaining
truly national regulation. See generally Layla Hughes, Limiting the Jurisdic-
tion of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormone Deci-
sion, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 915 (1998) (arguing that the SPS
Agreement's requirement of scientific evidence lacks foundation in domestic
and international law and fails to consider the multitude of reasons for the
measures).
42. Hormones Panel Report, supra note 38, 8.94.
43. Id. 9.1.
44. Hormones Appellate Report, supra note 38, 16.
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mones, rather than studies of hormones used specifically for
growth promotion) that a total EC ban on the use of hormone
growth promoters for domestic and imported beef was
desirable.45
The Appellate Body stated that while "[panels should rec-
ognize that members act from prudence and precaution where
risks of irreversible damage to human health are concerned,"
the precautionary principle does not by itself "and without a
clear textual directive to that effect"46 relieve the Panel from ap-
plying the normal principles of treaty interpretation. 47
The Appellate Body held the Panel to be in error where it
had found that risk assessment under the Agreement could not
include "matters not susceptible of quantitative analysis by...
empirical laboratory methods."48 At the same time, the Appel-
late Body stated that the SPS Agreement requires "that the re-
sults of the risk assessment must sufficiently warrant-that is
to say, reasonably support-the SPS measures at stake."49
Since the Appellate Body found that the EC did not offer enough
studies to "rationally support" its prohibition, the Body upheld
what it called the "ultimate conclusion" of the Panel.50
While more intellectually sound than the Panel Report, the
Appellate Body Report is problematic for proponents of precau-
tionary public health regulations. While the Appellate Body
may have soothed certain WTO critics by stating that it recog-
nized the validity of the motivation behind the EC ban, it failed
45. Id. 15.
46. Id. 124.
47. Id. 165.
The Appellate Body denied that the international standards referred to in
the SPS Agreement should be seen as having "obligatory force and effect," even
though such standards do enjoy a presumption of WTO-legality. Ominously
though, while the Appellate Body upheld the "important right" of members to
set their own individual standards, this right, the body continued, "is not an
absolute or unqualified right." Id. 173. The Appellate Body further stated:
"The requirement of a risk assessment . . . as well as of 'sufficient scientific
evidence' . . . are essential for the maintenance of the delicate and carefully
negotiated balance in the SPS Agreement between the shared, but sometimes
competing, interests of promoting international trade and of protecting the life
and health of human beings." Id. 177.
48. Id. [ 187.
49. Id. 193.
50. The Appellate Body explicitly refuted the Panel's conclusion that the
EC legislation was primarily motivated by a desire to exclude foreign beef; in
stating that it accepted the contention that the main reason for the legislation
was to protect human health, the Appellate Body seems to have left open the
possibility of the EC providing more cogent evidence to support its ban. See
Homones Appellate Report, supra note 38, IT 238-244.
1999]
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
to acknowledge that the raison d'6tre for the SPS Agreement it-
self is in fact to prevent domestic regulation from acting as an
impediment to trade. This underlying fact provides the ration-
ale for subjecting members to this evidentiary burden regarding
their own nationally-devised safety regulation.
Environmental regulation and trade principles inhabit two
separate universes. No matter how sympathetic the Appellate
Body may'have been with the aims of the EC legislation, the
SPS Agreement still has as its primary purpose not the maxi-
mum possible protection of public health, but a legal limitation
on what constitutes valid national measures.
2. The Indian Pharmaceuticals case
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) is quite properly named,
because it deals primarily with the "trade related" aspects of in-
tellectual property, addressing only tangentially social, eco-
nomic, and developmental aspects. 51 The TRIPS Agreement
was not aimed at wealthy developed countries, because most of
those countries already had credible regimes for the protection
of intellectual property rights. Rather, the TRIPS Agreement
was specifically aimed at the "newly industrialized countries"
(NICs), which have the capacity to reproduce the industrial
products of the developed world but lack the resources and the
political will to pay for the privilege.52
The TRIPS Agreement does not address its own effect on
ordinary persons in NIC countries. The agreement will likely
substantially increase the cost of essential goods. NICs are
characterized by large segments of the population living in pov-
erty, their condition somewhat ameliorated because intellectual
property rights held by companies in the developed world have
been ignored in industrial reproduction. 53
51. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 11 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
52. A. Samule Oddi, TRIPs - Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Eco-
nomic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 458 (1996).
53. See Martin Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent
Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 507 (1996) (arguing that Indian researchers, industry, and consumers will
ultimately benefit when India extends patent protection to areas which had
heretofore received no protection in that country). The authors concede that it
will be necessary for the Indian government to subsidize the pharmaceutical
needs of the poorest citizens when the system is implemented. Id. The authors
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The TRIPS Agreement demands, however, that all WTO
members bring their intellectual property protection up to an
agreed international standard, in part by incorporating by refer-
ence the major international conventions on the subject. 54 The
WTO has been more effective in establishing NIC protection for
intellectual property rights than any uni-focus organization, in-
cluding the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
because it has the multi-dimensional ability to impose sanctions
against non-complying countries in other areas of economic con-
cern to them.55
Although developed countries have only one year to bring
their national laws into compliance, the TRIPS Agreement does
allow developing countries five years and least developed coun-
tries ten years to comply. For developing countries now obliged
to extend patent protection to areas not previously patentable
under national laws, the transition could be extended to 2005 for
those products. There are, however, significant and subtle sub-
ject matter limits to this leniency. Because of the importance
placed on the sale of pharmaceutical products and agricultural
inputs in the massive developing world markets, the Agreement
states:
When a member does not make available as of the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement patent protection for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products commensurate with its obligations
under Article 27 (re patentable subject matter), that Member shall: (a)
notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI (on transition periods for de-
veloping countries), provide as from the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement a means by which applications for patents for such
inventions can be filed; (b) apply to these applications, as of the date of
application of this Agreement, the criteria for patentability as laid
down in this Agreement as if those criteria were being applied on the
date of filing in that Member, or, where priority is available and
claimed, the priority date of the application; and (c) provide patent pro-
tection in accordance with this Agreement as from the grant of the pat-
do not make clear what should or will happen if the system is phased in, but
without a system of pharmaceutical subsidy being created. Id.
54. For a general discussion, see Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compli-
ance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 391
(1996). See also J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPs
Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate World-
wide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11 (1998)
(describing the special difficulties of developing countries in implementing
TRIPs).
55. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51.
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ent and for the remainder of the patent term, counted from the filing
date. 5
6
The most sensitive and vital products, medicines and agri-
cultural chemicals, are required to be included in this "mailbox"
provision. These products are at the heart of the intellectual
property debate, because they raise the issue of whether devel-
oping countries should be forced to pay for the intellectual prop-
erty rights of products essential to the life and health of their
poor citizens. Indeed, under existing Indian law (i.e., pre-
TRIPS), patents for pharmaceutical products and agricultural
chemicals were unlawful for these socio-economic reasons.
When the price of essential medication rises in India, many peo-
ple without the means to purchase it and without public health
insurance will likely die. The developed world's system of subsi-
dizing the cost of intellectual property rights through insurance
and public health programs is often non-existent in NICs. Nev-
ertheless, the NICs are bound by the new TRIPS rules.
The U.S. did not hesitate to challenge India's failure to cre-
ate the mailbox system required by the TRIPS Agreement. 57 In-
dia's defense was largely technical; India did not attempt to
argue that the Agreement imposes an unjust and unworkable
obligation on its citizens. Rather, India hoped that the Panel
would take a generous view of a developing country's rights to
postpone compliance during the transition period.
Predictably, India failed to convince both the Panel and the
Appellate Body. The Panel focused entirely on the rights of the
prospective patent-holder under the TRIPS Agreement.58 As in
the Beef Hormones case, the Appellate Body reined in the
56. See id. art. 70(8). This article further states that where a product is
the subject of a patent application in a Member state in accordance with para-
graph 8(a), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstanding the
provisions of Part VI, for a period of five years after obtaining marketing ap-
proval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that
Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the entry
into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed and a
patent granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval
obtained in such other Member. See id.
57. Appended to the Panel Report as "evidence" provided by the U.S. is a
letter to the United States Trade Representative from a Senior Vice President
of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, in which he
says: "As you know, PhRMA companies are experiencing great losses in India
because of its failure to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products.
Unless India establishes a mechanism to ensure that mailbox applications can
be filed and given legal status required by the TRIPS Agreement... they will
continue to face enormous losses for decades to come." Patent Panel Report,
supra note 39.
58. See generally id.
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Panel's extraneous and expansive interpretation of the Agree-
ment, but it nevertheless upheld the Panel's decision.5 9
The real reasons for India's longstanding failure to allow
patents in these areas were never even alluded to in the deci-
sions nor apparently in the pleadings. Under the logic of the
WTO, once the TRIPS Agreement had been agreed to and rati-
fied, there was no further point in raising defenses that could
only be meaningful in the absence of the Agreement itself. In
other words, no amount of socio-economic evidence could help
India's case. The discourse of social good and distributive justice
thus disappears from the legal analysis, and WTO law triumphs
over domestic law considerations. GATT/WTO law, while some-
times referred to as creating a "constitution," is in fact law en-
tirely without constitutional context.
3. The EC Banana Regime case
Bananas were among the last products to be brought within
the EC's Single Market program. How to organize the banana
trade at the European level had long constituted an intractable
problem with the European Commission, and its 1993 "solution"
was a cumbersome compromise among sharply competing
interests. 60
One set of interests was the African, Caribbean, and Pacific
("ACP") banana-producing countries, former colonies which re-
mained bound to the European Member States through the
Lome Convention. 61 Some European states, notably France, It-
aly, and the UK, had created national banana quota systems
which guaranteed a market to these former colonial territo-
ries.62 It is likely that ACP banana production would have dis-
appeared had the European banana trade operated on purely
"free market" principles, because the rival Latin American plan-
tations reportedly could produce tastier bananas more cheaply.
Germany received a special "banana protocol" waiver from
the EC in the 1950s, allowing it to import as many Latin Ameri-
can bananas on a duty-free basis as it wished. 63 Certain other
EC states imported Latin American bananas at a standard rate
59. See generally id.
60. Bananas Panel Report, supra note 40, 3.4.
61. The Lome Convention is a trade and aid agreement dating back to the
1960s, when it was known as the Yaounde Convention. The current convention
is Lome IV, ratified for a ten year period in 1990 by the EC and 70 ACP
countries.
62. Bananas Panel Report, supra note 40, 3.5.
63. Id. 3.31.
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of duty. Spain and Portugal heavily favored their own domestic
producers, mainly based on territorial islands.64
Although Germany fiercely contested the 1993 regime, the
EC obtained legal clearance from the European Court of Justice
to proceed with its new regulation governing the banana mar-
ket.6 5 The banana regime provided, through a licensing and
tariff quota scheme, a certain proportion of the market to ACP
banana producers, but on a Europe-wide basis. 66 The intention
was to eliminate national Member State discrepancies in this
area of trade and allow for limited expansion in imports of more
efficiently produced Latin American bananas, while at the same
time preventing the economic devastation of former colonies in
ACP countries.
A number of Latin American producers, along with the
United States, brought a massive and legally complex challenge
to the EC regime. 67 The case involved issues of EC external sov-
ereignty, historical affiliations, and international development
policy, as well as the wishes of the EC Member States with re-
gard to international economic alliances and, of course, the
traditional interests of traders in bananas from particular
sources. Yet even such weighty considerations could not stand
up to the letter of WTO law. 68 Again, there was little room to
argue the motivation for the regime. The EC could only contend
that WTO law did not reach this far and that the EC had acted
within its rights as a WTO member in establishing the EC-wide
banana regime. 69
One of the many challenges raised by the U.S. against the
EC regime was based on Articles II (Most Favored Nation) and
XVII (National Treatment) of the GATS Agreement. 70 Europe
64. Id. 3.5.
65. Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 1994 ECR 1-4973.
66. Bananas Panel Report, supra note 40, 3.6.
67. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Dis-
tribution of Bananas, First Submission of the United States of America, 1995
WL 397092 I 7, 11 (July 9, 1996).
68. See generally Inger Osterdahl, Bananas and Treaty-Making Powers:
Current Issues in the External Trade Law of the European Union, 6 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 473 (1997) (describing the impugned banana regime from a Eu-
ropean legal perspective). See also Zsolt K. Bessko, Going Bananas Over EEC
Preferences? A Look at the Banana Trade War and the WTO's Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 28 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L. L. 265 (1996) (describing the legal basis for the banana dispute at WTO
level).
69. Bananas Panel Report, supra note 40, [ 4.15-4.31.
70. Id. [ 4.600-7.39.
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appeared not to have imagined that the terms of the GATS
Agreement would be used in such an expansionary manner by
the U.S. The EC insisted that the GATS Agreement is intended
"to regulate trade in services as such and that it covers the sup-
ply of services as products in their own right."71 Further, the EC
argued that "GATS is not concerned with the indirect effects of
measures relating to trade in goods on the supply of services."
72
The EC Banana Regime case makes clear that the U.S. was
prepared to comb the GATS Agreement for possible causes of
action. The response of the Panel and the Appellate Body con-
firmed that GATS was a potent new weapon not limited to the
concept of trade in services qua services, but instead was capa-
ble of being expanded to cover issues of non-discrimination
against the service providers behind ordinary trade in goods.
73
After the Banana Regime case, the term "services" has been in-
terpreted to include the service of providing tradeable goods.
This creates the potential for a separate and much more probing
level of inquiry grafted onto a first stage inquiry concerning free
trade in goods. That second inquiry raises the question of the
rights and interests of individuals who are dealing in the
goods-i.e. "services. "74
In the Banana Regime case, the EC explicitly committed it-
self to free trade in "wholesale trade services" under GATS, leav-
ing itself open to the Banana Panel's conclusion that it had
failed to live up to its GATS obligations.75 The EC's surprise at
the Panel's expansionary treatment of its GATS commitments
was apparently unfeigned. The Banana Panel wrote: "The scope
of the GATS encompasses any measure of a Member to the ex-
tent it affects the supply of a service regardless of whether such
measure directly governs the supply of a service or whether it
71. Id. 7.277.
72. Id.
73. See id. 73-86.
74. It is hardly surprising that U.S. trade policy makers would have seen
an opportunity under GATS to attack the Japanese Large Scale Retail Stores
Law with arguments relating to the rights of service providers. This is not to
suggest that the U.S. would have been guaranteed a victory on this point. But it
is of great significance that the Japanese believed that such an approach by the
U.S. could succeed, with grave consequences for retaining any regulatory con-
trol in the retail sector. There is, it should be pointed out, an after-the-fact
school of thought to the effect that Japan voluntarily conceded the loss of the
Large Scale Retail Stores Law in order to hand the U.S. an easy victory. Re-
gardless, it is clear that the Japanese could not have looked forward to a WTO
panel examining their retail store regulation in the light of the GATS
Agreement.
75. Id. 79.
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regulates other matters but nevertheless affects trade in
services."76
If the EC expected any substantive reversal by the Appel-
late Body, they were again disappointed. The Appellate Body ad-
dressed the GATS issue by stating: "Whether a certain measure
affecting the supply of a service related to a particular good is
scrutinized under the GATT 1994 or the GATS, or both, is a
matter that can only be determined on a case-by case basis."77
The Appellate Body continued: "For these reasons, we agree
with the Panel that the EC banana import licensing procedures
are subject to both the GATT 1994 and the GATS, and that the
GATT 1994 and the GATS may overlap in application to a par-
ticular measure."78 The Appellate Body further supported the
Panel's conclusions: "If Article II of the GATS (MFN) was not
applicable to de facto discrimination, it would not be difficult-
and indeed it would be a good deal easier in the case of trade in
services than in trade in goods-to devise discriminatory meas-
ures aimed at circumventing the basic purpose of that Article."7 9
Two things are clear in the wake of the EC Banana Regime
case: first, the GATS Agreement has nearly unlimited potential
to invalidate national regulations; second, a WTO member
county must consider the prospect of a GATS challenge in evalu-
ating its own domestic socio-economic law-making.
B. TREATY RATIFICATION V. THE SOVEREIGN POWER AND
POLITICAL DUTY TO LEGISLATE
There is no clear reason for giving precedence to WTO trade
principles over other complex sectors of law, sectors represent-
ing political compromises worked out through a process of incre-
mental recognition by legislators of diverse and often competing
socio-economic interests.
Mere ratification of the WTO Agreements is not sufficient
justification to disregard these political compromises. Unlike
other treaties, the WTO Agreement and related Uruguay Round
Agreements are not static commitments, but ongoing, open-
ended abdications of legislative power. Because of the disparate
subject matter appearing in various WTO disputes, academic
writers have largely failed to identify the conceptual thread
which unites them. Yet, in each case discussed supra, the de-
76. Id. 7.285.
77. Id. 221.
78. Id. 222.
79. Id. [ 233.
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fendant WTO member received a legal surprise as the WTO set
out to abolish some aspect of the national regulatory regime.
It is in this context that the Fuji-Kodak case must be ex-
amined, with an awareness of one major distinguishing feature.
In the Fuji-Kodak case, the most significant events involving
MITI and the Large Scale Retail Stores Law took place and were
settled by the parties before the panel process. Japan's willing-
ness to settle before a GATS issue was raised can only be under-
stood in light of the WTO's ability not only to invalidate national
regulations in the abstract, but also to enforce that invalidation
through a very direct power of authorizing proportional retali-
ation.
III. FUJI-KODAK, THE WTO COMPLAINT: WHAT
WAS LEFT OF THE CASE THAT CAME BEFORE
THE PANEL?
The Fuji-Kodak case has generally been viewed as a rather
weak and premature attempt by the United States to bring com-
petition law within the scope of the WTO.80 In addition, the ill-
considered emphasis by the United States on the GATT legal
concept of "non-violation nullification or impairment," as found
in Article XXIII(1)(b) has been widely discussed.8 ' The U.S.
likely decided to feature the "non-violation" strategy because of
the novelty of its arguments concerning Japan's alleged support
for restrictive distribution industry arrangements and Japan's
80. See, e.g., Renee Hardt, Kodak v Fuji: A Test Case for the Extraterrito-
rial Application of the Sherman Act, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309 (1997) (discussing
the antitrust implications). While Kodak could have considered legal action on
competition law grounds against Fuji in the U.S. courts, it decided on a more
"diplomatic" route through a Section 301 complaint to the USTR. See id. at 312.
While recognizing that the U.S. is to some degree conflicted as to whether it
wishes to see global competition rules established through the WTO, most Jap-
anese commentators seemed to believe that the U.S. had strategically intro-
duced premature competition law arguments in the Fuji-Kodak case to suggest
that market-access related competition matters should be on the WTO agenda.
For a comparative discussion of U.S.-EC attitudes in this regard, see Eleanor M.
Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997)
(offering a compromise proposal for bringing competition matters into the WTO
system). See also Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 543 (providing a summary of
perspectives on how competition law principles might be brought into the WTO,
and on dealing with cases such as Fuji-Kodak, where the market access com-
plaint involves a mix of public and private conduct).
81. See Sung-joon Cho, GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Frame-
work: Are They the Achilles' Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process? 39 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 311, 332 (1998).
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alleged failure to enforce its own domestic competition law in a
fair and impartial manner.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to analyze the ac-
tual contents of the Panel Report in the case-a decision so com-
pletely dismissive of U.S. arguments that readers may assume
that the U.S. came away from the dispute with nothing. The
U.S. prevailed, however, in that Japan agreed to overhaul its
Large Scale Retail Stores Law. The knock-on effects of the case
(occurring outside the litigation itself) are all the more dramatic
when one considers the overall tentativeness of the issues raised
before the Panel.
Though the line between corporate and governmental inter-
ests are increasingly blurred in the GATT/WTO legal system, a
complainant party must find offending official governmental be-
havior. It is not sufficient to bring a complaint over private con-
duct; there must be a showing that a national government has
engaged in conduct damaging to the trade interests of the com-
plainant.8 2 The U.S. focused in Fuji-Kodak on three basic cate-
gories of Japanese government "measures": (1) a set of official
guidelines and reports, dating back to the 1960s and 1970s,
which purportedly show the Japanese government attempting to
instruct Japanese manufacturers how to exclude foreign compe-
tition through manipulating the internal product distribution
system;8 3 (2) restrictions on large retail stores (as noted previ-
ously, there had been an alternative and far more powerful ar-
gument in a parallel action that the Large Scale Retail Stores
Law was in violation of the GATS Agreement);8 4 and (3) so-
called "Promotion Countermeasures," or competition rules that
82. See Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.87-6.132 and 10.28-
10.60.
83. -1967 Cabinet Decision;
-1967 (JFTC) Notification 17 on premiums to businesses;
-1968 Sixth Interim Report on Distribution Modernization Outlook
and Issues;
-1969 Seventh Interim Report on Systemization of Distribution
Activities;
-1969 Survey Report regarding Transaction Terms;
-1970 Guidelines for Rationalizing Terms of Trade for Photographic
Film;
-1971 Basic Plan for the Systemization of Distribution;
-1975 Manual for Systemization of Distribution by Industry: Camera
and Film
Id. 10.93.
84. -1974 Large Stores Law
-1979 Amendments to Large Stores Law
Id. 10.23.
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acted to hamper foreign companies in their marketing cam-
paigns in Japan.8 5
The Panel Report set out the main U.S. position. 6 The
United States alleged that these "measures," individually and
collectively, nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United
States within the meaning of GATT Article XXIII: 1(b), the "non-
violation" provision.87 It also alleged that the distribution meas-
ures were inconsistent with Article 111:4 of GATT."" Finally, the
U.S. alleged that unpublished enforcement actions by the Japan
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) under the Premiums Law and
fair competition codes, combined with the unpublished guidance
through which the Japanese authorities require applicants for
large stores to coordinate their plans with local competitors
before submitting a notification for government review, were in-
consistent with GATT Article X(1).89
THE NON-VIOLATION CLAIM
The Panel first addressed the comparatively obscure non-
violation nullification or impairment claim by the U.S. 90 It
85. -1967 JFTC Notification 17 on Premiums to Businesses;
-1967 Cabinet Decision on Liberalization of Inward Direct
Investment;
-1977 JFTC Notification 5 on Premiums to Consumers;
-1981 JFTC Guidance on Dispatched Employees.
-1982 Self-Regulating Rules Concerning Fairness in Trade with
Business;
-1982 Establishment of Fair Trade Promotion Council;
-1984 Self-Regulating Standards Concerning Display of Processing
Fees for Colour Negative Film;
-1987 JFTC approval of the Retailers Fair Competition Code and its
enforcement body, the Retailers Fair Trade Council
Id. J 10.23.
86. Id. 10.24.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. 10.33.
The Panel cited as authority for its approach to the non-violation standard the
EEC-Oilseeds case of 1986. It quoted that case as follows:
The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is that the
improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected
from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures pro-
scribed by the General Agreement but also by measures consistent
with that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties to
make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a right of redress
when a reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting party
as a result of the application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the General Agreement.
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pointed out that although the non-violation provision had been
"on the books" for almost 50 years, there had only been eight
instances of panels considering the question of a non-violation
nullification or impairment of benefit.9 1 With this in mind, the
Panel stated that this remedy "should be approached with cau-
tion and treated as an exceptional concept." This is for the obvi-
ous reason that "members negotiate the rules that they agree to
follow and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for
actions not in contravention of those rules."92
It may be that the concept of "non-violation nullification or
impairment of benefit" was best suited to GATT's diplomatic
roots in the 1940's and 1950's, rather than today's more complex
WTO law. During that fragile early period, GATT was only part
law and primarily diplomacy.93 There was an understanding
that countries should be induced to continue negotiating within
the GATT system. If GATT had been seen in the early days to
create clear winners and losers, the likelihood of broad, ongoing
international participation might have been reduced. The non-
violation remedy has thus become conceptually obsolete, as evi-
denced by its infrequent use.
94
91. See Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, 10.36. These are: Austra-
lian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GATT B.I.S.D. (vol. II) at 188 (1952);
Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, GATT B.I.S.D. (1' Supp.) at 30
(1953); Uruguayan Recourse, GATT B.I.S.D. (11'" Supp.) at 95; EC-Tariff
Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products From Certain Countries in the Medi-
terranean Region, GATT Doc. L/5576; EEC-Production Aids Granted on
Canned Fruit, GATT Doc. L/5778; Japan-Semi-conductors, GATT B.I.S.D.
(3 5th Supp.) at 116; EEC-Oilseeds, GATT B.I.S.D. (37' Supp.) at 86; US-Ag-
ricultural Waiver, GATT B.I.S.D. (37' Supp.) at 228.
92. See Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, 10.36.
93. See generally Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of
International Trade Relations, 17 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775 (1996) (discussing the
movement from the diplomacy of GATT's early years to the current law-based
regime).
94. "In GATT jurisprudence, most of the cases of non-violation nullification
or impairment have dealt with situations where a GATT-consistent domestic
subsidy for the producer has been introduced or modified following the grant of
a tariff concession on that product." Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1,
10.38. The Panel went on to say:
we wish to make clear that we do not a priori consider it inappropriate
to apply the Article XXIII:I(b) remedy to other governmental actions,
such as those designed to strengthen the competitiveness of certain
distribution or industrial sectors through non-financial assistance....
In the context of a Member's distribution system, ... it is conceivable
that measures that do not infringe GATT rules could be implemented
in a manner that effectively results in a disproportionate impact on
market conditions for imported products.
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The Fuji-Kodak Panel made clear that there are limits to
the scope of non-violation claims. It stated that "tariff conces-
sions have never been viewed as creating a guarantee of trade
volumes, but rather... as creating expectations as to competi-
tive relationships."95 The Panel thus began with a note of cau-
tion: the U.S. could not guarantee market access levels through
the novel approach of a non-violation claim relating to govern-
ment measures of a type not normally challenged in this type of
action. 96
From the Japanese point of view, the Panel's interpretation
of the term "measure" was of crucial significance. The U.S.
maintained that it had identified relevant government actions,
even though these could only be described as informal and hor-
tatory. The GATT system had encountered this question
before.97
The issue of the legal status of Japanese administrative gui-
dance, when it arose with reference to Article XI of GATT, was
resolved in general terms in the Japan-Semiconductor case. 98
The Fuji-Kodak Panel cited that case to the following effect:
"Where administrative guidance creates incentives or disincen-
tives largely dependent upon governmental action for private
parties to act in a particular manner, it may be considered a gov-
ernmental measure." The Fuji-Kodak Panel appropriated this
statement from the Semiconductor case, holding that certain
non-mandatory measures taken by governments could operate
in a manner equivalent to mandatory requirements, where the
difference between them "was only one of form and not of
substance."
For purposes of its Article XXIII:(b) analysis, however, the
Fuji-Kodak Panel took a broader view of what constitutes a gov-
ernment measure. 99 The Panel apparently believed that the
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The Panel continued:
The ordinary meaning of measure as it is used in Article XXII:I(b)
certainly encompasses a law or regulation enacted by a government.
But in our view, it is broader than that and includes other governmen-
tal activities short of legally enforceable enactments. At the same
time, it is also true that not every utterance by a government official or
study prepared by a non-governmental body at the request of the gov-
ernment or with some degree of government support can be viewed as
a measure of a Member government.
Id. 10.44.
98. See Japan-Semi-conductors, supra note 91, at 154-55.
99. The Panel went on:
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objectives of Article XXIII: 1(b)-namely, to preserve the balance
of GATT concessions by giving redress for government action not
otherwise regulated by GATT rules-required such an expan-
sive reading of "measure." The Panel was quick to caution that
the U.S. would bear a considerable burden of proof in establish-
ing that the administrative guidance of which it complained con-
tinued to exist and, assuming it did, that it was in fact
responsible for the nullification or impairment of benefit raised
in the complaint. 100
Had the U.S. succeeded in the non-violation argument, it is
possible that Japan would not have been required as part of the
remedy to alter the measures that gave rise to the complaint,
although compensation for the complainant would have been
necessary. 1 1 Thus U.S. reliance on non-violation nullification or
impairment is ironic in the context of the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law, because Japan had already conceded the point.
1. Non-Violation and Japan's Distribution Measures
("Countermeasures")
The Panel examined the specific Japanese government
measures raised by the U.S. and determined that "The U.S. case
against distribution 'measures' may best be understood in the
context of the general theme advanced by the United States to
the effect there exists in Japan a unique relationship between
government and industry." The U.S. maintained that Japan re-
In our view, a government policy or action need not necessarily have a
substantially binding or compulsory nature for it to entail a likelihood
of compliance by private actors in a way so as to nullify or impair legiti-
mately expected benefits within the purview of Article XXIII(l)(b). In-
deed, it is clear that non-binding actions, which include sufficient
incentives or disincentives for private parties to act in a particular
manner, can potentially have adverse effects on competitive conditions
of market access.... In cases where.., there is substantial reliance on
administrative guidance and other more informal forms of govern-
ment-business cooperation .... even non-binding, hortatory wording in
a government statement of policy could have a similar effect on private
actors to a legally binding measure or what Japan refers to as regula-
tory administrative guidance.
Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, 10.49.
100. As to the nature of the benefits which are alleged to have been nullified
or impaired, the Panel turned to the seminal Australian Subsidy case. See Aus-
tralian Subsidy, supra note 91, at 188. This case established that non-violation
nullification or impairment of benefit occurs if the action in question upsets the
competitive relationship between the two countries and could not have been
reasonably anticipated by the complaining party, given all the circumstances
and the terms of the General Agreement, at the time the tariff concession was
negotiated. Id.
101. See Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, IT 6.39-6.42.
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lied to an unusually high degree on various forms of semi-gov-
ernmental entities, including study groups and committees,
which in turn constituted a version of peer pressure on industry.
The U.S. contended that in the face of increased interna-
tional competition in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting from the
general lowering of tariffs and other common forms of market
protection, Japan worked stealthily to adjust the domestic dis-
tribution system in order to enhance the future market share of
national producers. 10 2 The Japanese government and major do-
mestic manufacturers allegedly colluded to pressure the distri-
bution sector: either Japanese wholesalers and retailers would
deal in domestic goods or they would pay a long-term economic
price.
Since the U.S. narrative was an economic conspiracy tale
and the character of the government measures complained of
were so amorphous, the U.S. was forced to make the difficult
case that it was the invisible as much as the visible behavior of
the Japanese government which should be examined by the
Panel. This in turn led the Japanese to argue that the U.S. was
merely playing on prejudice concerning Japan's supposedly
"unique" commercial culture. Japan alleged that the US was at-
tempting to substitute pre-conceived ideas about Japan for solid
proof of Japanese government behavior which might have led to
the loss of an expected GATT benefit.' 0 3
The U.S. may have been motivated to highlight competition
law issues as a way of demonstrating that competition law rules
should be included in the WTO. The U.S. raised these issues
knowing that questions of competition law were premature for
the WTO. In this sense, the non-violation setting was conve-
nient for the floating of an argument which would have been un-
likely to succeed in the violation context. Since there is no
102. The Panel stated:
The United States argues that when the liberalization of international
trading conditions became imminent, MITI and Japanese industry rec-
ognized the superiority of foreign firms which could create serious com-
petition for Japanese manufacturers and their products. MITI and
Japanese manufacturers, it is argued, consequently devised a plan to
streamline Japan's distribution system in order to bring it under the
control of domestic producers. The basic US position is that MITI
sought to strengthen vertical distribution channels that would handle
the products of a particular domestic manufacturer exclusively.
Id. 10.92.
103. See Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Pa-
per, First Submission of the Government of Japan, supra note 20, at 6.
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GATT/WTO competition law as such, it was unlikely that there
would be a violation found on a competition-based complaint. 104
The Panel first confronted the U.S. complaint regarding
"Distribution Measures," those measures that correspond to al-
leged Japanese government policy responses in the face of immi-
nent competition from foreign firms within the Japanese market
in the 1960s and 1970s. Japan termed its general program a
"modernization" of its distribution sector. However, according to
the U.S., Japan was engaged in an effort to substitute one form
of protection for another less overt form. 10 5
The Panel meticulously analyzed each "measure" and in
each case failed to find the necessary legal link between the pol-
icy or guidance articulated by the Japanese government and the
loss of benefit complained of by the U.S. The Panel obviously
placed a high legal priority on requiring the U.S. to establish an
indisputable connection between the government measure and
the impairment of benefit because it was not dealing with a vio-
lation of GATT. The U.S. did not meet the relevant standard of
proof with respect to the measures it had identified.
The U.S. attempted to create an impression that it had un-
earthed a large amount of damning material. It attempted to
substantiate this impression with official reports and guidelines
for the improvement of domestic industry, which the U.S.
claimed contained a subtext of intentional exclusion of outsiders
from domestic markets. The U.S. appeared to be offended by the
Japanese government's conscious economic planning, an ap-
proach which is anathema to laissez faire capitalism. It is
104. It is possible that an argument relating to a field of law not yet included
as subject matter in the GATT/WTO could succeed in establishing a GATT Arti-
cle III violation. One example of this would be the dispute raised by the U.S.
against Canada in the FIRA case, in which parts of a Canadian law to screen
foreign direct investment was found to violate Article III, even though there is
no specific mention of investment as a separate subject matter within GATT
itself. See Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb.
7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (30'" Supp.) at 140 (1984).
105. See Frank Schweitzer, Flash of the Titans: A Picture of Section 301 in
the Dispute Between Kodak and Fuji and a View Toward Dismantling Anti-
competitive Practices in the Japanese Distribution System, 11 Am. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 847, 864-65 (1996). Schweitzer writes:
While Kodak alleges a host of violations and unlawful practices, the
essence of Kodak's petition focuses on the alleged exclusionary film
market in Japan, which Fuji has fashioned by way of its distribution
system.... Kodak alleges the foundation of Fuji's market structure is
four primary wholesalers (tokuyakuten) who distribute a single brand
while colluding with Fuji to perpetuate an exclusionary structure on
lower levels of the sales chain, all the way down to the retail level.
[Vol. 8:197
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doubtful whether advising one's domestic industries to think
strategically is a nullification of one's trading partners' benefits.
The U.S. tried to read disingenuousness into MITI's assertions
of the need to "meet the challenges" of increased international
competition. The Panel, however, concluded that the U.S. did
not establish its non-violation case with regard to distribution
measures.106
2. Non-Violation and the Large Scale Retail Stores Law
The Panel then turned to the issue of the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law107 and the United States' non-violation nullification
or impairment claim. The US disliked the Japanese retail store
106. The Panel wrote:
The essence of the U.S. claim in respect of distribution "countermea-
sures" is that Japan created vertical integration and single-brand dis-
tribution in the Japanese film and paper market. In the U.S. view, this
was done through standardization of transaction terms, systemization
and limitations on premiums to businesses. As we have found above,
the United States has not been able to show that the various "meas-
ures" it cites have upset competitive relationships between domestic
and U.S. film and paper in Japan, principally because single-brand dis-
tribution appears to have occurred before and independently of those
"measures," but also because the United States has not demonstrated
that these "measures" are directed at promoting vertical integration or
single-brand distribution .... Equally, the United States has not ex-
plained why the vertically integrated, single-brand distribution struc-
ture of the film sector in Japan-a state of affairs that the evidence
suggests is similar to that occurring elsewhere in the world (including
in the United States)-would have broken down in the absence of con-
tinuing government intervention.
Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, 10.204. See also William Barringer,
Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute Resolution: Lessons Learned from
the U.S.-Japan Film Dispute, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 459, 466-67 (1998) (compar-
ing the distribution systems for film in both the U.S. and Japan); Jonathan
Gowdy, Exposing Kodak: A Critique of the Toleration of Anticompetitive Practice
Provision of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 47 FLA. L. REV. 459 (1995)
(criticizing the inconsistencies in the Kodak position).
107. The Large Scale Retail Stores Law was passed by the Japanese Diet on
October 1, 1973, with an effective date of March 1, 1974. The law established
notification procedures to regulate the opening of large store structures (where
more than one retailer may operate) and the opening and operation of retail
stores operating in such structures. As originally enacted, the law regulated
stores with floor space in excess of 1500 square meters. The 1979 amendment
effected two main changes: (1) the threshold for stores covered by the law was
lowered from 1500 square meters to 500 square meters; and (2) large stores
were divided into two classes-Class I stores (1500 square meters and above)
under MITI's jurisdiction, and Class II stores (500 to 1500 square meters)
under the jurisdiction of local prefectural governors. The law permits the regu-
lation of a store's size, opening date, operating hours, and closing days ('store
holidays"). See generally Upham, supra note 16 (discussing in detail the Large
Scale Retail Stores Law). The Panel confirmed,
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size regulation quite apart from the Kodak complaint, and this
case provided an opportunity to bring the issue to the WTO.
The U.S. argued that even after the Japanese government
set about to reorganize domestic wholesale operations in the
photographic materials sector, large retail stores remained what
the U.S. called "one potentially significant alternative distribu-
tion channel in Japan for foreign film manufacturers." There
was nothing special about film as a product; larger stores would
simply be more likely to carry foreign products, and U.S. film is
one of those products. The U.S. theory was that larger stores
were "less susceptible to pressure by domestic manufacturers."
The U.S. went so far as to assert that "if such stores were per-
mitted to proliferate across Japan .... wholesalers would be-
come less significant and foreign manufacturers could
circumvent the bottle-necked distribution system." Indeed, the
U.S. argued, it was the prospect of that very threat that first led
to the enactment of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law.108
Even in this truncated version (i.e., minus the GATS argu-
ments) of the U.S. attack on the Large Scale Retail Stores Law,
the fundamental contrast between U.S. and Japanese interpre-
tation of the law is readily apparent. Japan contended that the
Large Scale Retail Stores Law "reflects long-standing Japanese
policy, dating back to the enactment of the Department Store
Law in 1956, of regulating large stores to preserve a diversity of
small, medium and large retailing competitors, a policy found in
other countries as well." Japan further argued that "the law
does not concern products generally, or film in particular. The
law does not regulate which products large retailers can carry,
nor does it take into account which products a retailer sells
when determining whether and what adjustments are neces-
Article 3 of the law requires that a party intending to build or open a
large-scale retail store must submit, to MITI or the appropriate prefec-
ture, an initial notification including the proposed floor area and
planned opening date at least 12 months before the planned opening
date. If the store is deemed to be subject to the law's procedures, the
plans for the store must be explained to the appropriate authority, lo-
cal retailers and consumers. Following this, the authority may recom-
mend a reduction in the size of the store and/or a delay in the opening
date and/or a change in its opening hours and store holidays. In 1982,
MITI instituted, through Directive No. 36, a "prior explanation" re-
quirement to precede the initial notification required by Article 3. This
directive was revoked in 1992. Also in 1992, the minimum floor space
requirement for Class I stores was raised from 1500 square meters to
3000 square meters (and to 6000 square meters in cities designated by
ordinance).
Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, 1[ 10.210-10.211.
108. See id. % 10.212.
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sary." Japan asked the Panel to conclude from this that "the
Large Stores Law is incapable of adversely modifying competi-
tive conditions for any imported products, including film," and
that there is "no correlation between store size and the likeli-
hood of carrying foreign film brands."' 0 9
Given the extreme limitations on discourse in a WTO ac-
tion, it was appropriate for Japan to argue that the U.S. could
not prove cause and effect between the Large Scale Retail Stores
Law and U.S. market access. In light of the retail law's legisla-
tive history, it would have been gratuitous for Japan to argue
that the law represented valuable socio-economic policy and that
therefore the Panel should accept it. As indicated with respect to
other WTO disputes, there is no mechanism for invoking rea-
sons of social need or cultural preference in defending a nation's
legal regime against a WTO challenge, except in extremely lim-
ited circumstances as defined by the terms of GATT/WTO law
itself. Social need and cultural preference have no independent
power to influence the outcome of a WTO dispute.
In the context of the non-violation complaint, Japan's long-
standing legislative policy of protecting small retailers might
help determine whether the United States could have reason-
ably anticipated that Japan would pass successive measures for
the protection of small retailers. 110 The Japanese also described
the policy behind the law to discredit speculative U.S. argu-
ments as to the law's supposedly discriminatory purpose, the al-
leged effects of which the U.S. was unable to prove by credible
evidence.
The difficult problem for the U.S., in light of the "product-
neutral" characteristics of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law,
was to demonstrate precisely how the law nullified or impaired
an anticipated GATT/WTO benefit. Japan strongly denied that
109. Id. 10.213.
110. The Panel stated:
In analyzing the issue of reasonable anticipation at the conclusion of
the Kennedy Round, we take note of Japan's argument that Japanese
policy of regulating the mix of larger and smaller stores dates back to
the Department Store Law of 1956 and that, therefore, the United
States should have anticipated that such a policy would continue and
would evolve to take account of changes in store types.
Id. 10.217.
However, the Panel rejected the idea that a general policy implies knowl-
edge of future, more specific manifestations of that policy in the form of new
legislative acts. The Panel then analyzed at length precisely which amend-
ments the U.S. should be deemed to have had knowledge of, in light of the tariff
concessions received by the U.S. from Japan on photographic materials at the
relevant point in time. Id. 10.221.
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the law was capable of altering, even indirectly, the competitive
conditions between domestic and imported products-a crucial
element necessary to prove non-violation nullification or
impairment.
The Panel mentioned its awareness that the rationale be-
hind the legislation was to protect smaller retailers and agreed
with Japan that neither the law on its face nor its implementa-
tion bore any relation to product origin. "It is possible, how-
ever," the Panel asserted, "that a measure that is formally
neutral as to the origin of products may be shown to be applied
in a manner that results in upsetting the competitive relation-
ship between domestic and imported products to the detriment
of imports."111 The U.S. argued that large stores were more
likely to carry imported film, and the Japanese responded that
the U.S. data showed only that high-volume sellers were more
likely to carry imported film, regardless of store size.
The Panel expressed its "unease" with the U.S. logic
here,112 commenting that if the U.S. argument is accepted, then
any regulation on a store more likely to carry a foreign product
may give rise to a claim under Article XXIII:(b).113 The Panel
noted that the European Court of Justice faced similar argu-
ments with regard to Sunday trading laws and rejected them. 114
The Panel was also concerned that the U.S. argument was
based on the concept of legitimate expectations of evolving mar-
ket access-as if Japan should be expected to allow an ongoing
increase in large stores, which would in turn facilitate U.S. ac-
cess to the Japanese film market. But the Panel pointed out
that "normally, for competitive relationships to be upset, we
would expect an adverse change in the situation existing at the
time of the tariff concessions. In the case of subsidies, for exam-
ple, a Member reasonably expects that subsidies will not be in-
creased, not that they will be decreased."115
The United States failed to provide the Panel with sufficient
evidence of nullification or impairment of expected benefit.
Since the Panel focused on impairment of the complainant's ben-
efit, and not on any violation of GATT/WTO law, it placed a par-
ticularly heavy burden on the complainant to establish the
111. Id. 91 10.226.
112. Id. 10.227.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Panel cited to the following European cases: Torfaen Borough
Council v. B & Q Plc [1990] 3CMLR31; Keck & Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097;
Punta Casa SpA v Sindaco del Commune di Capena [1994] ECR 1-2355.
115. Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1, 91 10.232.
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factual validity of its expectations. In addition, it insisted that
the causal link be firmly established between the non-violative
behavior of the defending country and the loss of benefit by the
complainant.
3. Non-Violation and Japan's Promotion Measures
The final line of argument put forth by the U.S. under the
non-violation nullification or impairment of benefit arm of its
complaint concerned "Promotion Measures," measures dealing
with the regulation of economic inducements and aggressive ad-
vertising. The U.S. argued that even with the disadvantage it
suffered from access problems in the distribution system, its
marketing techniques could have compensated for the disadvan-
tage, but they were consistently prohibited from doing so by offi-
cial measures designed to prevent foreign firms from displaying
their competitive advantage in this area.
The U.S. complained that its ability to "use certain dis-
counts, gifts, coupons, and other inducements, or to rely upon
innovative advertising campaigns, particularly where price com-
parisons are discussed," had been severely constrained. These
measures had been implemented through the Premiums Law
and also issued as regulations by the Japan Fair Trade Commis-
sion (JFTC) through its authority under the Anti-Monopoly Act.
The U.S. conceded that this framework applied equally to do-
mestic and foreign firms but insisted that "Japan has imposed
them with the intention of striking against international compe-
tition by foreign imports following trade liberalization, i.e., the
ability of foreign manufacturers to convert their strong capitali-
zation and cost competitiveness into potent marketing strategies
and aggressive promotional competition."'1 16
Japan set out cogent, WTO-neutral reasons for its laws and
demonstrated that the regulations in question fell with exact
equality on foreign and domestic manufacturing companies. Ja-
pan rebutted the U.S. claim with the argument that the Premi-
ums Law was "designed to deal effectively with unfair trade
practices and encourage manufacturers to compete principally
on the basis of price and quality, not unfair inducements or de-
ceptive and misleading representations." Ordinary price and
promotional competition was not hindered. There was no limit
on advertising spending if deceptive statements were not made.
116. Id. 10.235.
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Lotteries and prize giveaways were controlled to protect the con-
sumer in a manner found in most other countries.
The U.S. identified a large number of "measures," many of
them guidance documents published by the JFTC, that were of a
similar semi-formal nature to those described in the distribution
industries context. Included in the complaint were codes
designed for self-regulation by the retail industry in relation to
promotional premiums and approved by the JFTC. As before, in
each instance the U.S. failed to convince the Panel that any
GATT/WTO benefit had been nullified or impaired. The Panel
refused to accept overbroad arguments, such as that the meas-
ures created a "chilling effect," as a substitute for the clear dem-
onstration of a loss of anticipated benefit.
Finally, the U.S. attempted to construct a doctrine of "com-
bined effects," claiming that the distribution countermeasures,
the Large Scale Retail Stores Law, and the promotion counter-
measures, when taken together, nullified or impaired benefits
within the meaning of Article XXIII(1)(b). The U.S. argued that
the distribution measures work together "as an organic
whole."U 7
The Panel noted that it was theoretically possible for such
an argument to be valid; however, the U.S. would still have had
to find specific instances to support this novel approach. The
U.S., the Panel stated, would have to "provide this Panel with a
detailed showing of how these alleged 'measures' interact with
one another in their implementation so as to cause effects differ-
ent from, and additional to, those effects which are alleged to be
caused by each 'measure' acting individually."' 18 The United
States' appeal to a general sentiment reflected in Japanese busi-
ness practices failed to resonate with the Panel.
The Panel remained firm in its adherence to the terms of
the GATT/WTO rules. Of its own role, the Panel stated: "In the
117. Id. % 10.351. The Panel continued:
The United States claims that MITI expected government and indus-
try to work together to set targets for industrial restructuring, and for
businesses to make efforts to achieve these targets, supported by gov-
ernment fiscal and other incentives. According to the United States,
leading scholars in Japan agree that one way that administrative gui-
dance is made effective is by a continuing process of studying, survey-
ing, cajoling, and targeting the use of fiscal incentives that keeps the
private sector focused on the goals set by the government, assesses
their achievement of those goals, and builds peer pressure on those
who are falling behind on their achievement.
Id.
118. Id. 10.353.
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final analysis, it is not incumbent upon this Panel to engage in
its own extensive, unaided investigation into the potential appli-
cability in this case of the U.S. theory of combined effects.
Rather, it is for the United States, as the complaining party, to
make a detailed showing of the relevance of this theory to the
matter at hand. We consider that the United States has failed to
make such a showing here."119 The U.S. appeared to be relying
on an unproveable belief that Japanese commercial and cultural
structures were inherently exclusionary and impenetrable. 12
0
The WTO Panel, a radically literal-minded judicial body, could
hardly be expected to accept this as a legal doctrine.12.
4. Reflections on the Outcome of the Dispute
The U.S. invested enormous resources in pursuit of this
complaint, and yet the U.S. arguments were legally unconvinc-
ing. It must be asked why the U.S. did not appeal the panel
decision. What was the full nature of the "understanding" be-
tween the U.S. and Japan which led the U.S. to drop the GATS
arm as it related to the Large Scale Retail Stores Law and led
119. Id. 10.367.
120. See Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Pa-
per, Rebuttal Submission of the Government of Japan, supra note 20, at 65.
The rebuttal document stated:
Consider the implausibility of the U.S. claims of conscious Japanese
subterfuge of GATT legal norms. The United States repeatedly implies
that Japan was consciously trying to hide the true effect of its policies,
and thus trying to fool others into believing Japan was complying with
its GATT obligations. This claim is baseless; everything being done
was published and widely publicized.... In reality, the U.S. case relies
on a claim about protectionist intent. The U.S. selectively quotes from
various documents to show the alleged protectionist intent. It is no
accident that the U.S. statement to the panel focused on this alleged
intent, with its section, "Why Japan Imposed these Measures," and did
not focus on the challenged government actions and policies them-
selves. ... The U.S. relies so heavily on this legally dubious approach
because it has little else to say. This panel could simply follow the
guidance of earlier panels that wisely decided to ignore ambiguous,
subjective, and indeterminate claims about government intent, and in-
stead focus on clear, objective, determinative terms of specific govern-
ment actions.... Of course, the Government of Japan was aware of the
challenges being imposed by capital liberalization. The U.S., however,
improperly takes every acknowledgement of this concern and spins a
tale of conspiracies to block imports.
Id.
121. As for the "GATT-violation" arguments put forward to challenge the
Japanese measures, the U.S. fared just as poorly. On each successive issue, the
Panel was brief and to the point: the U.S. failed to show GATT-illegal behavior
on Japan's part. See generally Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 1,
10.368-10.401.
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Japan to agree to abolish that law? Is it proper that the WTO
panel process should be used in this way, as a vehicle of interna-
tional pressure, to achieve diplomatic aims which the complain-
ant party has been unable to achieve in more conventional
ways? A WTO action is especially problematic when the subject
matter of the underlying dispute and that of the "concession"-
in this case, to abolish the Large Scale Retail Stores Law-are
only tenuously linked.
The Japanese bureaucracy has warmly embraced the new
post-1995 WTO structures, including the more legalistic dispute
resolution procedures, because the advent of the WTO has in its
view relieved Japan of intense bilateral pressures from the U.S.
and Europe. 122 The new WTO purports to render certain extra-
GATT/WTO bilateral agreements unlawful. For example, Vol-
untary Export Restraints (VERs) have been outlawed under the
new Safeguards Agreement. 123 This appears to have given Ja-
pan some confidence that the free-floating accusations, cultural
and otherwise, common to the Structural Impediments Initia-
tive period will disappear. It is significant that Japan hotly re-
sisted the U.S. attempt to rely on commercial stereotypes and
prejudice in its framing of the Fuji-Kodak complaint.
Despite the new "legalism" and the attempt to prevent coun-
tries from resorting to bilateral agreements under pressure
outside the WTO, there is a danger that the enhanced power of
WTO law will itself become a source of diplomatic intimidation.
The awkward combination of the basic Kodak market access
complaint and the Large Scale Retail Stores Law issue raises
the question of whether Japan was induced to capitulate on a
longstanding trade matter which should have been resolved in a
more conventional setting, such as in long-term trade
discussions.
IV. THE INCALCULABLE POWER OF GATS: WHAT
HAPPENED WHEN THE U.S. INCLUDED, THEN
DISCARDED, THE GATS ARM OF FUJI-KODAK
The WTO system has no mechanism for entertaining the
significance to a domestic constituency of a national law protect-
122. See generally MICHIKO IKEDA, GArrO KARA WTO E: BOEKI MASATSU NO
GENDAISHI (1996) (providing a historical exposition of Japanese psychological
relief at the end of bilateral trade pressures and the creation of a more legalis-
tic, rules-based WTO).
123. Agreement on Safeguards, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-14 (Dec. 15,
1993), art. 11(1)(b).
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ing it. The degree to which non-GATT/WTO or "equitable" con-
siderations can be taken into account by a reviewing panel is set
within the relevant WTO Agreement. In essence, a WTO panel
is limited to considering member country arguments regarding
whether the challenged national law does or does not violate
some GATT/WTO principle or rule.
From the WTO's perspective, the defendant national juris-
diction must decide how it will defend its domestic legal regime
during the panel and Appellate Body procedures under the
terms of the relevant GATT/WTO agreement and then, if neces-
sary, change that regime in accordance with WTO diktat. The
consequences of invalidating the national law are not of any ap-
parent concern to the WTO.
GATT/WTO law and domestic regulation, including protec-
tive laws for the environment, labor, and small businesses, de-
rive from fundamentally different sources and sets of political
considerations. In the case of Japan's Large Scale Retail Stores
Law, the domestic constituency for protecting small and medium
retailers lost out to an alliance of multinational, mainly U.S.-
based mega-retailers who exerted external pressure, with the
assistance of a few very large Japanese retailers. These large
retailers would likely never have succeeded in undoing the
Large Scale Retail Stores Law in the absence of the external
pressure.
As indicated supra, there reportedly was not a single politi-
cian in Japan who initially favored abolishing the Large Scale
Retail Stores Law. MITI bureaucrats were required to negotiate
intensively over a long period to convince politicians to support a
change in the law which would have the effect of hastening the
decline and even disappearance of the small retailer in Japan.
MITI relied on the argument that eliminating the law would
raise Japan's international profile as a country willing to liber-
alize its internal economy, even at the expense of a politically
strong yet economically vulnerable constituency. More omi-
nously, MITI contended that if the U.S. persisted and prevailed
with its GATS argument, Japan's international reputation for
maintaining an open domestic market would suffer.
Japan's Large Scale Retail Stores Law was passed to protect
Japan's vulnerable small retail sector from domination and de-
feat by the much larger and more powerful chain stores. 124 It is
highly significant that Japan, as a member country being
124. For a concise discussion of this legislative intent issue, see NAMIKATA,
supra note 22, at 20-22. Namikata is interested in the paradigm shift repre-
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threatened with a WTO challenge, was induced to drop its na-
tional policy of protecting a segment of its own society. This shift
is the logical extension of post-1995 GATT/WTO law under
which the domestic democratic process itself becomes
"illegal.' 25
Most academic articles on WTO law end with a discussion of
what occurs in the WTO-level litigation itself. International
trade law scholars must examine the empirical effects of WTO
law within actual jurisdictions, such as what will likely happen
to the traditional retailing sector in Japan post-Fuji-Kodak.
It is inadequately understood outside Japan that economic
policy encompasses social and cultural policy. 12 6 Japanese eco-
nomic policy is more than a simple reflection of a cultural ethos;
rather, economic policy for Japan in the modem period has ena-
bled it to prosper without sacrificing cultural bonds. While the
Japanese bureaucracy appears to feel liberated from bilateral
pressure in the new WTO era, its pre-WTO socio-economic com-
pact and its highly selective internationalization and moderni-
zation may fall as a result of the WTO's more stringent rules
and far more absolutist dispute settlement system.
It is frequently pointed out that by the time Japan promised
to abolish the Large Scale Retail Stores Law in 1997, the law
had virtually ceased to be stringently applied in any case. 127 Be-
cause of relentless U.S. pressure during the Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative phase as well as policy confusion in Japan, the
law was frequently ignored.128 What is striking about the effect
sented by the abolition of the old Large Scale Retail Stores Law and the crea-
tion of three substitute laws with different-more acceptable-stated "intents."
125. See Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjust-
ment and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 186-89 (1998) (making the point that national
governments are more responsive to the demands of the IMF and World Bank
than to their own domestic constituencies). See generally John Gray, supra
note 37 (exploring the destabilizing effects of modem international trade rules).
126. Interview with MITI official, in Tokyo, Japan (July 15, 1998).
127. See NAMIKATA, supra note 22, at 21; Kenji Higuchi, Kisei Kanwa to
Daikibo Kouritenpoho no Ronri, CHUSHO KoKo GEPPO, Dec. 1997, at 28-33.
Higuchi explains that from the time of the early Structural Impediments Initia-
tive talks, Japan began to relax its application of the Large Scale Retail Stores
Law. Id.
128. Namikata makes clear that during the Structural Impediments Initia-
tive, the U.S. wanted nothing short of abolition of the Large Scale Retail Stores
Law. NAMIKATA, supra note 22, at 22-23. The U.S. logic was that one of the
methods of reducing the U.S. trade deficit with Japan was to allow for stores big
and powerful enough to carry U.S. goods, and to build new shopping centers
that would serve to enhance consumer demand. See id.
[Vol. 8:197236
FUjI-KODAK
of the GATS arm of the Fuji-Kodak case is that it appears to
have pushed Japan to take a firm decision on abolishing its
Large Scale Retail Stores Law. Under U.S. and European pres-
sure, Japan had for years been discussing plans to end protec-
tion for certain vulnerable domestic sectors, including small
retailers, yet it also avoided taking decisive action which would
constitute abrupt abandonment of those sectors. Before the
Fuji-Kodak case, the political fate of the small- and medium-
scale retail sector was highly uncertain. The possibility of a
high-profile WTO challenge to Japan's retail regulatory system
provided the final impetus for the Japanese bureaucracy to
bring an end to that uncertainty. 129
A. MITrs TASK IN ABOLISHING THE LARGE SCALE RETAIL
STORES LAw
MITI was in the unenviable position of having to abolish the
Large Scale Retail Stores Law to comply with its commitment to
the U.S.; create a substitute law which would resemble retail-
regulating laws in other industrialized countries in order to in-
sulate the new law from further WTO actions; and, finally, man-
129. There is obviously a difference of opinion whether the Large Scale Re-
tail Stores Law has continued to have much effect, especially in the mid-nine-
ties. A Japan Economic Institute of America Report states that
[alithough procedural changes set in motion by the July 1990 Struc-
tural Impediments Initiative agreement have expedited government
action on retailers' plans to build stores with sales areas of 500 square
meters (5,400 square feet) or more and given stores considerable lee-
way on operational issues,... major retailers are still forced almost as
often as not to revise their expansion plans because of opposition from
smaller counterparts. In FY 1996, for instance, the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry's Large Scale Retail Stores Council re-
portedly ordered alterations in 44.7 percent of the 2,416 applications
filed to open new outlets. The changes included cuts, frequently dras-
tic, in the proposed sizes of the buildings, earlier closing hours and
more non-business days.
Susan MacKnight, Japan to Replace Large Retail Store Law, Japan Economic
Institute of America Report, Mar. 20, 1998.
In short, while legal academics and others involved in the cause of small
and medium retailers would say that the law had failed miserably to protect the
sector, and while more neutral commentators would say that not even the
Large Scale Retail Stores Law could save this sector against market forces, the
U.S. maintained throughout that the law acted as a draconian restriction on the
development of the large scale retail sector in Japan. It is unclear to what ex-
tent the U.S. position was influenced by the wish to see more large scale Japa-
nese retail outlets capable of selling more foreign product-or, by contrast, to
what degree the U.S. was hoping for a retail "big bang" which would see U.S.
retailers (such as Wal-mart or OfficeMax) enter Japan for the purpose of bypas-
sing the existing distribution system altogether, thereby selling more U.S.
goods. The difference in emphasis is worth exploring.
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age to pacify the small and medium scale retailers with the
content of the new law without excessively aggravating trade
friction with the U.S. MITI accomplished all of this with ex-
traordinary political skill. While the U.S. would have preferred a
completely free market approach, it was apparent that the new
set of laws would not be nearly as effective at blocking the intro-
duction of large-scale retail outlets. The constituency most
likely to resist these legislative changes, the small and medium
retailers, was unclear about the likely effectiveness of the new
laws and therefore was reduced to a wait-and-see attitude. The
third pillar of the new set of laws, that which appropriates funds
for the regeneration of traditional town centers, was intended as
a sweetener.
B. THE "THREE PILLARS" OF THE NEW RETAIL STORE LAws
The three new laws that will replace the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law in the year 2000 might appear to resemble the old
law in spirit. Both systems are outwardly based upon procedur-
ally loose consultation and adjustment-oriented instruments.
The principal difference between the two systems is that under
the old law MITI could order compliance if a prospective retailer
did not follow the official guidelines. 130 While the new laws also
130. While smaller retailers were unwilling to see this potent (albeit very
sporadically applied) legal device abandoned, even the most ardent defender of
small shops in the traditional town center (the shotengai) believed that the law
was not working as originally intended. Japan had developed, courtesy of MITI,
an internally contradictory attitude towards the protection of the endangered
smaller retail sector. See Upham, supra note 16, at 404. Upham explains
under "The History and Structure of the LSRSL" that the original roots of the
law go back to the 1930s. He writes that the law protected small and medium
stores against excessive competition from bigger stores, but also helped to guar-
antee the territorial shares of department stores by restricting new entrants.
Upham states:
Passage of the LSRSL can best be explained as a political compromise
among department stores, small and medium retailers, and super-
stores, but official MITI commentaries on the LSRSL invariably cited
strengthened consumer protection and industry rationalization as stat-
utory goals. Besides guaranteeing small merchants an "enterprise op-
portunity," Articles 1 and 11 of the LSRSL specifically require due
consideration to the interests of consumers and to the well-being of the
retail industry as a whole.... While these goals were potentially con-
tradictory, legal commentators contemplated the bureaucratic creation
of a set of criteria that would balance these varied interests on a case
by case approach.
Id. at 406.
Under the Large Scale Retail Stores Law, when a store was being planned,
the developer was required to notify its plan to MITI at least 12 months before
the planned opening. A public briefing was also required to be held, with infor-
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involve public consultation followed by official suggestions or
recommendations, MITI cannot order a retailer to comply. 131 A
mation on the plan to be presented to the relevant local government, the cham-
ber of commerce, the local association of small and medium retailers, and
consumers resident in the area. The MITI Minister would then ask the Large
Scale Retail Store Council to review the evidence and assess the case, taking
into account the opinions of all interested parties. The Council would then
present its opinion to the MITI Minister. Local governors were also entitled to
express their view on the proposed store.
Upham writes: "A [MITI] recommendation had no legal force and a retailer
could violate its terms without incurring legal liability or being subject to MITI
sanctions. If a retailer did violate the terms of a recommendation, however,
MITI had the power to issue a meirei, or order, which was compulsory." Id. at
407.
The crucial element was that the MITI Minister (or the prefectural gover-
nor, in the case of Type II large stores), based on all these local inputs, would
issue a series of recommendations to the prospective store developer. The Min-
ister might suggest, for example, that the store size be reduced (and mandatory
reductions were often very significant) or the hours of opening altered. While
the official recommendation on its own was not legally binding, the store devel-
oper was nevertheless not free, as he or she will be under the new regime, to
ignore it.
131. The new laws involve public consultation without the same commercial
consultation, followed by official suggestions emanating from the local govern-
ment level without a decision-making role for national government authorities.
The three new laws which are to replace the Large Scale Retail Stores Law are
as follows: The Large Scale Retail Stores Location Law, or Daiten Ritchi Ho (an
essentially environmental assessment law); the Revised Town Planning Law, or
Kaisei Toshi Keikaku Ho (an amendment to existing town planning law, to al-
low for zoning by local government of certain areas so as to limit these to small
and medium shops); and the Town Center Revitalization Law, or Chushin Shi-
gaichi Kasseika Ho (an urban renewal law, creating funds and tax incentives
for the regeneration of traditional town centers). For a full description of each
of the new laws, see NAMIKATA, supra note 22, chs. 3-5.
The most significant of these laws is the first, since it contains the central
process by which any proposed large-scale retail outlet will be reviewed. The
structural weaknesses of the Large Scale Retail Stores Location Law would in-
dicate an inevitable lowering of the future standard of protection provided for
the small and medium retail sector, a sector that has acted as one of the main-
stays of Japanese socio-cultural traditions.
Commentators also point out that it has historically been the responsibility
of small shopkeepers in the shotengai to plan and direct local festivals, or omat-
suri, events which are essential to the continuation of traditional culture. It
must also be borne in mind that in the latter years of the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law, where "non-implementation" or quasi-implementation had been
the norm, a certain momentum in favor of mega-retailing had been generated.
Especially in some Japanese provincial towns and cities, the traditional shoten-
gai is not so much under threat as nearly extinct. As is the case in the United
States, the mega-retailers of Japan (both domestic and foreign) are essentially
creating alternative towns out-of-town. See Takayoshi Igarashi, Kogai Ten
Kara Machi wo Mamoru, YAMAGATA SHINBUN, May 26, 1998. Professor
Igarashi writes that not only do the new mega-retailers stock traditional food,
clothing, and household goods, but increasingly have also added cinemas, bow-
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local government can oppose the new store, but in the absence of
zoning or other clear factors militating against its construction,
the store developer can proceed and ignore official guidance. The
process is also now more expeditious. 132
From the U.S. point of view, its timely pressure on Japan in
the highly public forum of the WTO caused Japan to capitulate
and to agree effectively to eliminate the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law.133 Neither supporters nor detractors of the old law
are now satisfied because of the ambiguous nature of the substi-
tute laws and the unpredictability concerning the stringency
with which they will be applied after 2000. While outwardly
honoring its commitment to the U.S. to repeal the Large Scale
Retail Stores Law, MITI had adroitly fashioned the new three-
part Japanese law on established European regulatory mod-
els.' 34 While pleased at the repeal of the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law, the USTR is already expressing public skepticism
concerning Japan's motives in devising the new legal regime. 135
ling, and other sports facilities-virtually creating a city within itself. Id.
Against such pressures, he concludes, the traditional shotengai cannot begin to
compete. Id.
132. The former regime could take up to eight years before a store would be
allowed to proceed. The new system is firmly time bound, with the expectation
that store developers will receive final word within a year of lodging the
application.
133. Interview with U.S. Embassy official, in Tokyo, Japan (June 15, 1998).
134. See Large Scale Retail Store Law Today, MITI, May 1997. MITI is at
pains to compare the regime in Japan with those in five European countries,
the U.S., and Korea. Id.
135. Note the tone of impatience in the USTR:
Along with repealing the Large Stores Law, the Japanese Government
enacted a new Large Scale Retail Stores Location Law,... which elimi-
nates the use of supply/demand adjustment mechanisms. The new law
gives local governments authority over the establishment and expan-
sion of large stores. The new regime will require local governments to
apply transparent criteria that are limited to environmental factors
(e.g., traffic and noise) set out in guidelines issued by the central
government.
The U.S. Government has expressed strong concerns to the Japa-
nese Government regarding the new Large Stores Location Law, in
particular with regard to allowing interested parties to review and
comment on the draft guidelines, the need for close monitoring by the
central government of implementation of the new law by local govern-
ments, and the need to facilitate the resolution of complaints from re-
tailers seeking the establishment or expansion of a large store.
The U.S. Government also is very concerned that local govern-
ments will use new zoning authority granted to them by recent amend-
ments of the City Planning Law to block large retail stores. The
amended City Planning Law allows local governments to create new
types of "special-use zones," such as "small-to-medium-sized retail
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MITI emphasises the fact that the new laws are made up of
elements that are common to the "retail regimes" in other devel-
oped countries. This selectivity was probably to protect the sub-
stitute regime from any future WTO action by the U.S., since the
U.S. would hardly attack a regime comparable to those found in
Europe.
The MITI-led legal changes go beyond a pro forma shift of
emphasis from protecting an organized, traditional political con-
stituency to safeguarding the environment and quality of life for
residents and consumers. The new laws are unlikely to hinder
large retail developments, as the USTR speculated. MITI con-
sciously drafted the laws in a manner that enables the individ-
ual large retailer to choose whether or not to comply with official
recommendations. MITI is aware of this weakness in its new
legal regime and is concerned that it will become a source of do-
mestic political criticism. 136
The new legal regime is in fact more generous towards large
retailers than similar regimes in most European countries,
where definitive permit systems and clear lines of enforcement
tend to prevail. It must be asked why the Japanese government
went beyond the degree of liberalization necessary to bring its
retail regime in line with those in certain EU countries. A sys-
tem which allows the relevant authority either to reject on policy
grounds or impose strict, enforceable conditions is now, for all
practical purposes, dead in Japan.
It is important to understand the general political context in
which these changes have occurred. Japan is experiencing a
strong movement towards "decentralization" (bunken) and a
move away from the old-style clientalist politics. Ironically, this
has served to make the new retail regime appear more benign
than it otherwise might have. The three new laws replacing the
Large Scale Retail Stores Law may appear to be part of a larger
store zones," which could be restricted to small and medium sized
retailers.
The U.S. Government strongly urges the Japanese Government to
ensure that local governments do not use the new measures to create
an environment for large stores that is similar to (or worse than) that
arising under the current Large Stores Law, to impose unreasonable
restrictions on large retail stores, or to favor small and medium-sized
retail stores over large stores. The U.S. Government will continue to
monitor this issue closely.
USTR, supra note 3, at 2.
136. Interviews with MITI officials, in Toyko, Japan (June-July 1998).
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trend, one driven by the popular democratic/decentralization
sentiment currently prevalent in Japan. 137
C. Focus ON THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF "PILLAR ONE" OF
THE NEW LEGAL REGIME: THE LARGE SCALE RETAIL
STORES LOCATION LAW (DAITEN RiTfcHI Ho)
The purpose of the new Large Scale Retail Stores Location
Law is not in any overt sense to oppose the creation of mega-
shopping malls. Rather, in accepting the "necessity" for these
stores, it attempts to find a way to prevent the deterioration of
the surrounding environment. 138 Under the new procedure, the
proposed large store owner will issue a public notice of his intent
to develop any store larger than 1,000 square meters. Within a
strict time limit, potential environmental problems will be iden-
tified and the interested public and local government authorities
will be permitted to comment. The owner/developer of the pro-
posed store will respond to these comments by announcing
measures to address the problems and issues raised. Ultimately,
the local government authority will make a recommendation,
either positive or negative.
A stunning weakness in the system is that the recommenda-
tion is not binding and it cannot be backed up with an official
order to comply. In the absence of a zoning prohibition or some
other bar, the store owner/developer may ignore the recommen-
dation and proceed, even in the event of a very negative assess-
ment by the local government authority. MITI does not view
this as a serious weakness, since no businessperson in Japan
would ignore the recommendation of such a body with impunity.
137. See Sukehiro Hosono, Tenpo Chosei, Shichoson Reberu De, NIHON
KEIzAi SHINBUN, Jan. 20, 1998. While recognizing problems and weaknesses in
the new legal regime, Professor Hosono describes the old Large Scale Retail
Stores Law as a relative failure. He agrees that the legislative changes are in
line with the general shift towards decentralization of government and with
administrative reform, and sees the new legal regime as reflecting a change
from "economic constraints" to "social constraints," in that consumer behavior
will play a more decisive role.
138. See Takayoshi Igarashi, Toshi Wa Doko Ni Yuku No Ka? ZoKEi, No. 15,
June 1998, 22-30. Contrast this evaluation of the new law with Professor
Upham's description of the old Large Scale Retail Stores Law, supra note 130,
where he points out that the LSRSL was also a compromise among competing
retail interests, and not meant to prevent all large store developments. The ma-
jor difference between the old and the new regimes, however, is that the old
LSRSL, insofar as it involved a slow and cumbersome process of review-often
lasting years-and included a binding order of compliance with conditions, had
far greater power to keep out certain types of mega-retail development
indefinitely.
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MITI overlooks the fact that foreign retailers would not feel par-
ticularly restricted by social pressures from the local business
community or local residents. It is in fact highly likely that only
a multinational retailer, without any significant ties to the local-
ity or indeed to Japan, would be in a position to ignore a nega-
tive recommendation with such impunity. Ironically, MITI is
invoking a concept of informal social and peer pressure that is
virtually irrelevant for the largest international retail
operators. 13 9
The new "environmental" discourse of retailing, as found in
the Large Scale Retail Stores Location Law, taps into emerging
trends of political thought in Japan mentioned supra, especially
decentralization (bunken), consumer power, and the end of
clientalist politics. As so often happens during times of political
reform, popular dissatisfaction with the immediate political past
is being exploited by major business interests in a sleight-of-
hand that is quite invisible to the public at large. 140 Interest-
139. The two laws related to the main Large Scale Retail Store Location
Law have been treated with skepticism by Japanese commentators. See supra
notes 129-30 and accompanying text. One allows special zoning to exclude
large stores, and the other deals with incentives to revitalize traditional town
centers. See NAMIKATA, supra note 22, chs. 4 & 5.
Critics dismiss the town planning law amendment on several grounds:
first, because it relies on zoning, which is quite weak in Japan compared to
other developed countries; second, because it only encompasses a very small
part of Japan's total land; and third, because it lacks the added weight of a
complementary national land use directive on the subject of large stores. See
Igarashi, supra note 131, at 24. Its effectiveness will also depend upon the vigi-
lance of local governments, which in turn depends upon the ability of local poli-
ticians to resist the temptation to compete for scarce commercial activity in the
form of new mega-malls. The urban renewal incentive scheme, like all such
schemes, will depend upon the level of consistent funding provided. Id. at 24-
25. It is difficult to imagine how such a scheme will form the basis for smaller
town center shops to compete with out-of-town shopping centers; experience in
the United States and some parts of Europe indicates that urban renewal
schemes cannot halt the decline of older shopping areas confronted with the
lure of malls. For a vivid description of this process at work in the United
States, see JAMES KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DE-
CLINE OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE (1994). Instead, it is highly likely
that the network of "mom and pop" stores in traditional town centers in Japan
will be replaced by niche shops that do not purport to serve general needs, espe-
cially after business hours.
140. See NAMIKATA, supra note 22, at 24. Namikata declares that the
change from the old law to the new represents a shift in Japan from extreme
protectionism of the small and medium business sector to an emphasis on mar-
kets and seikatsusha-a concept that encompasses both consumers and people
generally, as they make their way in the world. The new law, he explains, is not
an instrument of protection, but rather one to ensure that the environment is
not destroyed by the advent of mega-retailing. Namikata states that this, in
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ingly, just as WTO law lacks any articulation of "equity" and
remains a hermetically sealed set of principles operating in iso-
lation from non-market considerations, so too the discourse sur-
rounding the abolition of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law and
the creation of the Large Scale Retail Stores Location Law fails
to reflect the inevitable loss of social and cultural cohesion that
the dying away of shotengai will certainly bring in its wake.
Under cover of bunken, the highly popular slogan indicating
a movement toward decentralization and a limited devolution of
government power onto local governments throughout Japan,
MITI has assisted the central government in abdicating its role
as protector of the small business sector. The national govern-
ment could have retained in the legislation a set of land use
guidelines creating a strong presumption against larger out-of-
town retailing. It is unclear whether MITI believed that such an
addition to the law would have been indefensible in WTO terms.
The new law could be described as fatalistic and accepting of the
drastic impending changes in the retail sector. The more star-
tling implications of the new regime are sugar-coated with refer-
ences to environmental adjustments, the quality of life of
residents and consumers, and urban regeneration.
14 1
It is also unclear what is meant by the often-invoked "world
standard" when it comes to retail-related law.14 2 MITI undoubt-
edly studied European and American retail development law in
an attempt to create a WTO-proof regime. However, it is com-
mon in Europe to have an environmentally-focused retail law
which provides either local or national authorities the power to
refuse permission to the out-of-town developer or owner. In the
wake of disastrous planning in the 1980s, the UK has recently
gone so far as effectively to ban large out-of-town shopping de-
turn, emphasizes the needs of seikatsusha. This sort of discussion is now com-
mon in Japan, as younger intellectuals blur the distinction between Japan's
internal need for a loosening of the reins of power held by the old guard of politi-
cians and the desire of multinational corporations and the larger Japanese cor-
porations to exploit this sentiment in favor of economic liberalization and open
markets.
141. See Deborah Weitsman, Mega-malls Becoming Major Players in Japan,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 6, 1997, at 1. Weitsman reports: "'We're transfer-
ring the U.S. system (of malls) to Japan,' said Kunihiko Ueta, president of MGS
Japan Co., a Japan-U.S. joint venture that plans to build 15 megamalls in this
country [Japan] within 10 years. Up until now, megamall developers say, they
have faced many visible and invisible barriers unique to the Japanese market."
Id. It would seem that these developers have no doubt about what the impend-
ing changes to the law actually mean.
142. See Kenji Higuchi, Sekai ni Okureru Ogata Tenpo Kisei, NIKKEI RYuTsu
SHINBUN, July 28, 1998.
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velopments. Since the UK planning guidelines come from the
central government, local authorities essentially have no power
to grant permission for such developments. 143
On its own terms, the new Large Scale Retail Stores Loca-
tion Law has little legal coherence. The principal areas of con-
cern permitted to be taken into account under the new regime
are traffic congestion, parking issues, noise, and waste. There is
no mention in the law of the need to protect existing businesses,
the traditional shopping cores of towns, the landscape, or other
"cultural" features of the locality. 144 All socio-economically "pro-
tective" language was avoided. The new law is unlikely on its
own to assist the preservation of town centers in any meaningful
way. 145 For an "environmental" law of this type to serve complex
and multiple purposes, the definition of "environment" must be
broad. Here, it is narrow, but despite this commentators and
advocates insist that its purpose is to protect the entire "envi-
ronment" and quality of life in which residents and consumers
live, work, and shop.
V. FUJI-KODAK IN ITS PROPER CONTEXT
The Fuji-Kodak case is an example of the struggle between
domestic political constituencies, who were accustomed over
years of democratic development to think that they had a right
to influence the content of national legislation, and global pres-
sures to "streamline" domestic legal regimes in order to facilitate
the free flow of goods, capital, and supposed consumer choice.
The Fuji-Kodak case, while apparently part of a particular trade
history involving the U.S. and Japan, is in fact one of a series of
WTO cases wherein important domestic regulations have been
eliminated by the application of free trade principles.
143. See STUART BELL, BELL AND BALL ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 225 (4 th ed.
1997).
144. It is, of course, possible to accommodate a broad notion of environment
in a legal instrument. Note the concept of environment used in the EC's envi-
ronmental impact assessment directive, which includes cultural heritage as
part of the environment. See Council Directive 85/337 on the Assessment of the
Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment.
145. It should be noted that even this level of retained control was resented
in some quarters in the U.S. diplomatic community. One official in the U.S.
Embassy in Tokyo indicated to the author that the Japanese were using the
environment as a "pretext" for the continued protection of the smaller retail
sector when, in this official's view, what Japanese consumers really wanted was
to get in the car on weekends and drive to an American-style suburban mega-
mall. Interview with U.S. Embassy official, in Tokyo, Japan (June 8, 1998).
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It remains to be asked whether domestic constituencies un-
derstand the degree to which they have become sidelined in the
WTO process. Since there is no natural political forum in which
this essential questioning can occur, it is perhaps left to interna-
tional trade law scholars to look beyond the technicalities of the
subject and analyze the full implications for vulnerable groups
of the harsh application of post-1995 international trade law.
What happens to the valid non-GATT, non-WTO reasons for a
domestic regulation when it is invalidated by the WTO system?
Do these reasons disappear, even though the constituencies that
brought them into being have not yet disappeared, and would
under normal circumstances (in the absence of WTO pressures)
survive at the domestic political level?
Now that the GATT/WTO system has begun functioning in the
manner of a genuine legal system, 146 it must be subjected to a
normal level of scrutiny by legal scholars. Similarly, political
representatives must be held accountable for changes in domes-
tic legal regimes which emanate from the WTO. Anything less
would indicate that the WTO system has taken on legislative
powers in the absence of democratic justification or
accountability.
Mere ratification is not sufficient justification for this mul-
tifaceted legal changeover, which goes to the heart of democratic
theories of government. If an international treaty such as the
WTO sets up an autonomous, unpredictable, and open-ended
system of alternative law, then it can no longer be classified with
other, more limited and "static" treaties. Neither can a field of
law be isolated from other, competing areas of law, or from gen-
eral social consequences. Equity demands that fact and circum-
stance color our understanding of the letter of the law and that
all law be applied according to a sense of due process and pro-
portion. The very fact that GATT/WTO law is an isolated set of
principles set up according to a theory of social good which has
not in itself been ratified by voters world-wide means that panel
law is simplistic and thus fails as law.
GATT/WTO law implicitly declares its lack of interest in the
"legislative intent" behind any domestic regulation which stands
opposed to free trade principles. A panel may be aware of this
intent, but must not be influenced by non-GATT/WTO consider-
ations in its decision-making. Since 1995, free trade principles
have had the power to undo domestic laws and regulations, re-
146. Recall John H. Jackson's praise of the WTO system for having elimi-
nated "GATT a la carte." See JACKSON, supra note 35, at 47.
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gardless of the law's purpose and no matter how strongly it is
supported by domestic constituencies. Some might suggest that
citizens and consumers have been liberated from protectionist
domestic regulation in favor of the far preferable free trade prin-
ciples of GATT/WTO. We have, however, no political measure of
this "preferability."
The Fuji-Kodak case ought not to be seen as a minor, rather
eccentric case-one in which the U.S. "lost its touch" with the
WTO panel and failed to produce sufficient evidence. Rather, it
was a case in which the U.S. grafted its long-time wish that Ja-
pan would cease protecting its small and medium retailers onto
a case ostensibly about the difficulties of distributing film in Ja-
pan, with devastating results for the Japanese small retail sec-
tor. Stereotypic academic interpretations of WTO disputes have
exacerbated the Western tendency to see all Japanese domestic
regulation through the prism of U.S. and European attempts to
open Japanese markets.
Although the WTO has advertised as one of its virtues that
it is newly transparent and has eliminated special deals be-
tween member countries outside the WTO, the Fuji-Kodak case
initially involved the threat of a powerful GATS challenge,
which caused Japan to move quickly with its long-delayed over-
haul of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law. It is the Japanese
small and medium business sector which has lost its influence,
while domestic politicians upon whom that sector has tradition-
ally relied can claim helplessness in the face of external
pressure.
It is significant that this pressure goes beyond the familiar
bilateral pressure emanating from the USTR. This time, there
was the prospect of having a WTO panel make sweeping nega-
tive statements about the deep structure of Japanese retailing,
including presumably to the effect that it systematically "dis-
criminates" against large retail service providers. MITI decided
to "settle" in Fuji-Kodak and managed to persuade the entire
Japanese political order that removing the Large Scale Retail
Stores Law was a necessary step. Ultimately, it was the fate of
the traditional shotengai that was finally "settled."
Had each of the Uruguay Round Agreements been put to
the voters in member nations for referendum, many, if not most,
would have failed to pass. To those who say that such demo-
cratic input would render the system too tentative and un-
wieldy, the only intellectually defensible response is that the
WTO dispute settlement process has obviously overreached in
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taking on the trappings of a judicial system. Modern judicial sys-
tems must, under any democratic theory, rest on a basis of com-
plex legislation derived from competing social inputs. Since the
WTO lacks such a basis, it is at best a partial, and at worst a
fraudulent, judicial system. Without addressing this central is-
sue, the WTO nevertheless continues to move forward on an am-
bitious route towards global economic integration. It is a matter
for urgent academic consideration that no mechanism exists for
measuring the desirability among national voters of this newly
strengthened global legal system.
